Chicken dilemma: Difference between revisions
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The "chicken dilemma" refers to a situation where two similar candidates share a majority, but are opposed by one candidate which has a plurality against either of the two. |
The "chicken dilemma" refers to a situation where two similar candidates share a majority, but are opposed by one candidate which has a plurality against either of the two. This can happen when there is a majority split into two subfactions (below called A and B), competing against a united minority (below called C) that is bigger than either of the subfactions. |
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This scenario has been called the "chicken dilemma" because in many election systems, the two majority subfactions are in a situation that resembles the classic "[[W:Chicken (game)|chicken]]" or "snowdrift" game (especially if voters are not sure which of the two subfactions is larger). |
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If we assume each faction has a single, coordinated strategy defined as "cooperate" (vote both candidates A and B above bottom) or "defect" (bullet vote, with only the favorite above bottom); and that each faction values its preferred choice at 10, its less-preferred choice at 8, and candidate C at 0, many voting systems lead to the following payoff matrix: |
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{| id="Payoff matrix" style="background:white; float: right; clear:right; text-align:center;" |
{| id="Payoff matrix" style="background:white; float: right; clear:right; text-align:center;" width="225" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="8" align="right" |
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|style="width:33%; "| |
| style="width:33%; " | |
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|style="width:33%; border-bottom: solid black 1px;"| cooperate |
| style="width:33%; border-bottom: solid black 1px;" | cooperate |
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|style="width:33%; border-bottom: solid black 1px;"| defect |
| style="width:33%; border-bottom: solid black 1px;" | defect |
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|style="border-right: solid black 1px; text-align: right; "| cooperate |
| style="border-right: solid black 1px; text-align: right; " | cooperate |
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|style="border-right: solid black 1px; border-bottom: solid black 1px; background:white; font-size:120%; "| 9, 9 |
| style="border-right: solid black 1px; border-bottom: solid black 1px; background:white; font-size:120%; " | 9, 9 |
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|style="border-right: solid black 1px; border-bottom: solid black 1px; background:white; font-size:120%; "| 8, 10 |
| style="border-right: solid black 1px; border-bottom: solid black 1px; background:white; font-size:120%; " | 8, 10 |
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|style="border-right: solid black 1px; text-align: right; "| defect |
| style="border-right: solid black 1px; text-align: right; " | defect |
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|style="border-right: solid black 1px; border-bottom: solid black 1px; background:white; font-size:120%; "| 10, 9 |
| style="border-right: solid black 1px; border-bottom: solid black 1px; background:white; font-size:120%; " | 10, 9 |
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|style="border-right: solid black 1px; border-bottom: solid black 1px; background:white; font-size:120%; "| 0, 0 |
| style="border-right: solid black 1px; border-bottom: solid black 1px; background:white; font-size:120%; " | 0, 0 |
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|style="font-size: 90%;" |
| colspan="3" style="font-size: 90%;" |''Fig. 2: Chicken with numerical [[Risk dominance|payoffs]]'' |
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# Other voting systems, such as [[ICT]], try to exploit the fact that in a real-world election, A and B are never perfectly balanced; one subfaction is always larger. In this case, a voting system can encourage the smaller group to cooperate by threatening to elect C (punishing both groups) if the smaller group defects. The criterion below is passed only by this kind of voting system. |
# Other voting systems, such as [[ICT]], try to exploit the fact that in a real-world election, A and B are never perfectly balanced; one subfaction is always larger. In this case, a voting system can encourage the smaller group to cooperate by threatening to elect C (punishing both groups) if the smaller group defects. The criterion below is passed only by this kind of voting system. |
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The chicken dilemma happens when there is a [[Condorcet winner]] and a majority Condorcet loser, but not a majority Condorcet winner. In many voting systems, supporters of one of the two similar candidates have a dilemma, like a game of "chicken": they can either "cooperate" and support both similar candidates, helping to ensure the opposing plurality candidate loses but risking a win by the less-preferred of the similar ones; or they can "betray" and support only their favorite candidate, trying to take advantage of cooperation by the other side. |
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'''Supporting definition:''' |
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=== Formal definition === |
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'''Premise:''' |
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# The A voters and the B voters, combined, add up to more than half of the voters in the election. |
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# None of the C voters vote A or B over the other. |
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of the voters in the election. |
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5. None of the C voters vote A or B over the other. |
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B doesn't win. |
B doesn't win. |
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=== Further analysis === |
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[end of CD definition] |
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In the chicken dilemma scenario described in the premise of the Chicken Dilemma Criterion (CD), defined above, if B won, then the B voters would have successfully taken advantage of the A voters' cooperativeness. The A voters wanted to vote both A and B over the candidate disliked by both the A voters and B voters. Thereby they helped {A,B} against the worse candidate. But, with methods that fail CD, the message is "You help, you lose". |
In the chicken dilemma scenario described in the premise of the Chicken Dilemma Criterion (CD), defined above, if B won, then the B voters would have successfully taken advantage of the A voters' cooperativeness. The A voters wanted to vote both A and B over the candidate disliked by both the A voters and B voters. Thereby they helped {A,B} against the worse candidate. But, with methods that fail CD, the message is "You help, you lose". |
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=== Methods passing criterion === |
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ICT, [[Symmetrical ICT]], [[MMPO]], MDDTR, [[IRV]], [[Benham's Method|Benham's method]], [[Woodall's method]] |
ICT, [[Symmetrical ICT]], [[MMPO]], MDDTR, [[IRV]], [[Benham's Method|Benham's method]], [[Woodall's method]] |
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Because CD is so simple, such a simple situation, could there be another |
Because CD is so simple, such a simple situation, could there be another |