Chicken dilemma: Difference between revisions

Content added Content deleted
(Copy/paste merge of Chicken dilemma criterion oldid=6800, using that article as the summary for now. Still editing/merging...)
(Attempt to do some copyediting of the merged version)
Line 1: Line 1:
The "chicken dilemma" refers to a situation where two similar candidates share a majority, but are opposed by one candidate which has a plurality against either of the two. That is to say, there is a [[Condorcet winner]] and a majority Condorcet loser, but not a majority Condorcet winner. In many voting systems, supporters of one of the two similar candidates have a dilemma, like a game of "chicken": they can either "cooperate" and support both similar candidates, helping to ensure the opposing plurality candidate loses but risking a win by the less-preferred of the similar ones; or they can "betray" and support only their favorite candidate, trying to take advantage of cooperation by the other side.
The "chicken dilemma" refers to a situation where two similar candidates share a majority, but are opposed by one candidate which has a plurality against either of the two. This can happen when there is a majority split into two subfactions (below called A and B), competing against a united minority (below called C) that is bigger than either of the subfactions.


This scenario has been called the "chicken dilemma" because in many election systems, the two majority subfactions are in a situation that resembles the classic "[[W:Chicken (game)|chicken]]" or "snowdrift" game (especially if voters are not sure which of the two subfactions is larger).
Here's an example of a chicken dilemma scenario, in the format of "#voters:true preferences":


== Analysis ==
* 33: A>B>>C
* 22: B>A>>C
* 45: C>>A=B

== Details ==


One type of election scenario which is particularly fraught is when there is a majority split into two subfactions (below called A and B), competing against a united minority (below called C) that is bigger than either of the subfactions. This scenario has been called the "chicken dilemma" because in many election systems, the two majority subfactions are in a situation that resembles the classic "[[W:Chicken (game)|chicken]]" or "snowdrift" game (especially if voters are not sure which of the two subfactions is larger). That is, if we assume each faction has a single, coordinated strategy defined as "cooperate" (vote both candidates A and B above bottom) or "defect" (bullet vote, with only the favorite above bottom); and that each faction values its preferred choice at 10, its less-preferred choice at 8, and candidate C at 0, many voting systems lead to the following payoff matrix:
If we assume each faction has a single, coordinated strategy defined as "cooperate" (vote both candidates A and B above bottom) or "defect" (bullet vote, with only the favorite above bottom); and that each faction values its preferred choice at 10, its less-preferred choice at 8, and candidate C at 0, many voting systems lead to the following payoff matrix:


{| id="Payoff matrix" style="background:white; float: right; clear:right; text-align:center;" align=right cellspacing=0 cellpadding=8 width=225
{| id="Payoff matrix" style="background:white; float: right; clear:right; text-align:center;" width="225" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="8" align="right"
|-
|-
|style="width:33%; "|
| style="width:33%; " |
|style="width:33%; border-bottom: solid black 1px;"| cooperate
| style="width:33%; border-bottom: solid black 1px;" | cooperate
|style="width:33%; border-bottom: solid black 1px;"| defect
| style="width:33%; border-bottom: solid black 1px;" | defect
|-
|-
|style="border-right: solid black 1px; text-align: right; "| cooperate
| style="border-right: solid black 1px; text-align: right; " | cooperate
|style="border-right: solid black 1px; border-bottom: solid black 1px; background:white; font-size:120%; "| 9, 9
| style="border-right: solid black 1px; border-bottom: solid black 1px; background:white; font-size:120%; " | 9, 9
|style="border-right: solid black 1px; border-bottom: solid black 1px; background:white; font-size:120%; "| 8, 10
| style="border-right: solid black 1px; border-bottom: solid black 1px; background:white; font-size:120%; " | 8, 10
|-
|-
|style="border-right: solid black 1px; text-align: right; "| defect
| style="border-right: solid black 1px; text-align: right; " | defect
|style="border-right: solid black 1px; border-bottom: solid black 1px; background:white; font-size:120%; "| 10, 9
| style="border-right: solid black 1px; border-bottom: solid black 1px; background:white; font-size:120%; " | 10, 9
|style="border-right: solid black 1px; border-bottom: solid black 1px; background:white; font-size:120%; "| 0, 0
| style="border-right: solid black 1px; border-bottom: solid black 1px; background:white; font-size:120%; " | 0, 0
|-
|-
|style="font-size: 90%;" colspan=3 |''Fig. 2: Chicken with numerical [[Risk dominance|payoffs]]''
| colspan="3" style="font-size: 90%;" |''Fig. 2: Chicken with numerical [[Risk dominance|payoffs]]''
|}
|}


Line 34: Line 30:
# Other voting systems, such as [[ICT]], try to exploit the fact that in a real-world election, A and B are never perfectly balanced; one subfaction is always larger. In this case, a voting system can encourage the smaller group to cooperate by threatening to elect C (punishing both groups) if the smaller group defects. The criterion below is passed only by this kind of voting system.
# Other voting systems, such as [[ICT]], try to exploit the fact that in a real-world election, A and B are never perfectly balanced; one subfaction is always larger. In this case, a voting system can encourage the smaller group to cooperate by threatening to elect C (punishing both groups) if the smaller group defects. The criterion below is passed only by this kind of voting system.


The chicken dilemma happens when there is a [[Condorcet winner]] and a majority Condorcet loser, but not a majority Condorcet winner. In many voting systems, supporters of one of the two similar candidates have a dilemma, like a game of "chicken": they can either "cooperate" and support both similar candidates, helping to ensure the opposing plurality candidate loses but risking a win by the less-preferred of the similar ones; or they can "betray" and support only their favorite candidate, trying to take advantage of cooperation by the other side.
== Definition ==


An example of a chicken dilemma scenario, in the format of "#voters:true preferences":


* 33: A>B>>C
'''Supporting definition:'''
* 22: B>A>>C
* 45: C>>A=B


== Definition ==
The A voters are the voters who vote A over everyone else. The B voters are the voters who vote B over everyone else. The C voters are the voters who vote C over everyone else.


=== Formal definition ===
The A voters are the voters who vote A over everyone else. The B voters are the voters who vote B over everyone else. The C voters are the voters who vote C over everyone else.'''Premise'''


# There are 3 candidates: A, B, and C.
'''Premise:'''
# The A voters and the B voters, combined, add up to more than half of the voters in the election.

# The A voters are more numerous than the B voters. The C voters are more numerous than the A voters, and more numerous than the B voters.
1. There are 3 candidates: A, B, and C.
# The A voters vote B over C. The B voters refuse to vote A over anyone.

2. The A voters and the B voters, combined, add up to more than half
# None of the C voters vote A or B over the other.
of the voters in the election.

3. The A voters are more numerous than the B voters. The C voters are more numerous than the A voters, and more numerous than the B voters.

4. The A voters vote B over C. The B voters refuse to vote A over anyone.

5. None of the C voters vote A or B over the other.

'''Requirement:'''


==== '''Requirement''' ====
B doesn't win.
B doesn't win.


=== Further analysis ===
[end of CD definition]


----

In the chicken dilemma scenario described in the premise of the Chicken Dilemma Criterion (CD), defined above, if B won, then the B voters would have successfully taken advantage of the A voters' cooperativeness. The A voters wanted to vote both A and B over the candidate disliked by both the A voters and B voters. Thereby they helped {A,B} against the worse candidate. But, with methods that fail CD, the message is "You help, you lose".
In the chicken dilemma scenario described in the premise of the Chicken Dilemma Criterion (CD), defined above, if B won, then the B voters would have successfully taken advantage of the A voters' cooperativeness. The A voters wanted to vote both A and B over the candidate disliked by both the A voters and B voters. Thereby they helped {A,B} against the worse candidate. But, with methods that fail CD, the message is "You help, you lose".


=== Methods passing criterion ===
----
Some methods that pass the Chicken Dilemma Criterion:

'''Some methods that pass the Chicken Dilemma Criterion:'''


ICT, [[Symmetrical ICT]], [[MMPO]], MDDTR, [[IRV]], [[Benham's Method|Benham's method]], [[Woodall's method]]
ICT, [[Symmetrical ICT]], [[MMPO]], MDDTR, [[IRV]], [[Benham's Method|Benham's method]], [[Woodall's method]]

----


Because CD is so simple, such a simple situation, could there be another
Because CD is so simple, such a simple situation, could there be another