Expanding Approvals Rule: Difference between revisions
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EAR elects B and C here. Yet arguably A and D are better from the perspective of [[PSC]], since they are the 1st choices of the voters represented by B and C. |
EAR elects B and C here. Yet arguably A and D are better from the perspective of [[PSC]], since they are the 1st choices of the voters represented by B and C. |
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One possible way to elect A and D here might be to somehow use EAR to apportion seats to groups of voters (i.e. guarantee that the 20 B>C voters will get both seats on account of them being able to split into two groups of 10, larger than any other group), then rerun the election (with a new reduced quota, A and D are each the 1st choices of half of the voters and would thus win). Such an idea might be best implemented by using a [[Highest averages method|highest averages method]] to reweight ballots, similar to [[SPAV]]. |
One possible way to elect A and D here might be to somehow use EAR to apportion seats to groups of voters (i.e. guarantee that the 20 B>C voters will get both seats on account of them being able to split into two groups of 10, larger than any other group), then rerun the election (with a new reduced quota, A and D are each the 1st choices of half of the voters and would thus win). Such an idea might be best implemented by using a [[Highest averages method|highest averages method]] to reweight ballots, similar to [[SPAV]]. |
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Quota could be reduced by accounting for exhausted ballots. Quota = (total preferences in first n ranks)/(n*(k+1)) |
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== References == |
== References == |