Independence of clone alternatives: Difference between revisions
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By adding clones, the Condorcet winner B<sub>1</sub> becomes defeated. All three clones beat each other in clear defeats. |
By adding clones, the Condorcet winner B<sub>1</sub> becomes defeated. All three clones beat each other in clear defeats. |
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A benefits from that. So, by adding two clones of B, B changed from winner to loser. Thus, the minimax method is vulnerable against spoilers and fails the independence of clones criterion. |
A benefits from that. So, by adding two clones of B, B changed from winner to loser. Thus, the minimax method is vulnerable against spoilers and fails the independence of clones criterion. |
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⚫ | STAR voting consists of an automatic runoff between the two candidates with the highest rated scores. Suppose we use the rated definition of cloning, where a candidate's clones have scores nearly identical to the candidate who was cloned. If the winner in STAR voting differs from the [[Range voting]] winner, then cloning the latter will make him or her win. Therefore, STAR voting has a teaming incentive. |
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== Notes == |
== Notes == |
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There is no longer a [[Condorcet winner]]. However, there is still a [[Smith set]] which only consists of the B clones. So in order to be cloneproof, a [[Condorcet method]] has to be [[Smith-efficient]] in this example. |
There is no longer a [[Condorcet winner]]. However, there is still a [[Smith set]] which only consists of the B clones. So in order to be cloneproof, a [[Condorcet method]] has to be [[Smith-efficient]] in this example. |
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⚫ | STAR voting consists of an automatic runoff between the two candidates with the highest rated scores. Suppose we use the rated definition of cloning, where a candidate's clones have scores nearly identical to the candidate who was cloned. If the winner in STAR voting differs from the [[Range voting]] winner, then cloning the latter will make him or her win. Therefore, STAR voting has a teaming incentive. |
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===Example=== |
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==See also== |
==See also== |