Left, Center, Right: Difference between revisions
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'''Left, Center, Right''', or '''LCR''' for short, is a type of election scenario that is useful for demonstrating center squeeze and that [[house monotonicity criterion|House monotonicity]] is incompatible with the [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]] and [[Droop proportionality criterion|Droop proportionality]] criteria. |
'''Left, Center, Right''', or '''LCR''' for short, is a type of election scenario that is useful for demonstrating [[center squeeze]] and that [[house monotonicity criterion|House monotonicity]] is incompatible with the [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]] and [[Droop proportionality criterion|Droop proportionality]] criteria. |
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The pattern of the scenario is as follows: |
The pattern of the scenario is as follows: |
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== Center squeeze == |
== Center squeeze == |
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C is "everybody's second choice", and so is the Condorcet winner, but methods that are susceptible to center squeeze will elect either L or R. [[First Past the Post electoral system|Plurality]] elects either L or R, and [[instant-runoff voting]] (and [[Carey]]) fails to detect C's broad support and eliminates the center early. [[Descending Acquiescing Coalitions]] and [[Descending Solid Coalitions|DSC]] are also sufficiently similar to [[First Past the Post electoral system|Plurality]] to fail. |
C is "everybody's second choice", and so is the Condorcet winner, but methods that are susceptible to [[center squeeze]] will elect either L or R. [[First Past the Post electoral system|Plurality]] elects either L or R, and [[instant-runoff voting]] (and [[Carey]]) fails to detect C's broad support and eliminates the center early. [[Descending Acquiescing Coalitions]] and [[Descending Solid Coalitions|DSC]] are also sufficiently similar to [[First Past the Post electoral system|Plurality]] to fail. |
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== Criterion incompatibility == |
== Criterion incompatibility == |