McGarvey's theorem: Difference between revisions
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McGarvey's theorem <ref>https://www.researchgate.net/publication/243774148_A_Theorem_on_the_Construction_of_Voting_Paradoxes</ref> proves that majority rule can result in any kind of societal preference ordering among the candidates. Sometimes it is called McGarvey's method. |
McGarvey's theorem <ref>https://www.researchgate.net/publication/243774148_A_Theorem_on_the_Construction_of_Voting_Paradoxes</ref> proves that majority rule can result in any kind of societal preference ordering among the candidates. Sometimes it is called McGarvey's method. |
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It is often cited and used when discussing pairwise majority rule in order to construct examples with various types of preference orderings. |
It is often cited and used when discussing pairwise majority rule in order to construct examples with various types of preference orderings resulting in various kinds of social preference orders (i.e. [[order of finish|orders of finish]]). |
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[[Category:Majority–minority relations]] |
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[[Category:Ranked voting methods]] |
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Latest revision as of 07:38, 24 October 2022
McGarvey's theorem [1] proves that majority rule can result in any kind of societal preference ordering among the candidates. Sometimes it is called McGarvey's method.
It is often cited and used when discussing pairwise majority rule in order to construct examples with various types of preference orderings resulting in various kinds of social preference orders (i.e. orders of finish).