Method evaluation poll 2005

Please rate the following single-winner methods on a scale from 0 to 10, on functional merit alone. That is, leaving the issue of public salability aside, how well will the method perform in a large, contentious electorate? Decimal ratings are allowed.

The answers you give on your first pass through the survey need not be final. Please feel free to change/update your answers as many times as you like. You may leave a question mark next to your score for a given method if you are particularly uncertain about that score, and you may also substitute a question mark for the number if you feel unable to evalute the method.

Feel free to add more methods to the poll, especially interesting ones! This goes without saying, but please don't change other people's ratings! Try to keep the columns tidy so that it's clear whose scores are whose. The format of this poll is based on that of the essential questions poll. Please identify yourself by your initials in the body of the poll, and in the participants section at the top of the poll. This poll will be ongoing; that is, it has no closing date. Also, there is no official tally method, and no official winner will be declared.

the participants

JG James Green-Armytage
CB Chris Benham
KV Kevin Venzke
DK Dave Ketchum

the methods

binary input

   JG       CB   KV   DK   ??   ??
Plurality
    2       2     2    2
Two round runoff
    3       5     3    3
Approval
   5?       6     8    5
Random Ballot
    1       1     1    1

ranking input

not Condorcet-efficient

   JG     CB   KV   DK   ??   ??
Borda count
   1       4    0    0
IRV without equal rankings
   4       7    3    3
ER-IRV(whole)
   6       4    ?    ?
ER-IRV(fractional)
   6       6    3    ?
Bucklin
  3?       6    6    0

nearly Condorcet-efficient

   JG      CB    KV   DK   ??   ??
minmax(pairwise opposition)
    5       8     7    ?
CDTT,IRV
    7      9.5    7    ?
CDTT,MMPO
    ?             8    ?
Condorcet//Approval with FBC patch ("tied at the top" rule)
    ?             9    ?

Condorcet-efficient

   JG      CB    KV   DK   ??   ??
ranked pairs(WV)
    7       7     8    8
ranked pairs(margins)
    2       4     3    3
river(wv)
    7             8    7
beatpath(WV)
    7       7     8    7
beatpath(margins)  
    2       4     3    3
sequential dropping(WV)
    7       ?     7    ?
minmax(WV)
    4       ?     7    7
minmax(margins)
    1       ?     3    3
Smith//minmax(WV)
    6       ?     7    ?
Smith//minmax(margins)
    2       ?     3    ?
Nanson
  5.5?      ?     3    ?
Raynaud
   6?       ?     3    3

ranking input with approval cutoff

   JG      CB    KV   DK   ??   ??
definite majority choice a.k.a. ranked approval voting
  6.5      8.5   6    3
approval weighted pairwise (e.g. with ranked pairs base)
    9       8    7    3
approval margins
  5.5       9    ?    3
democratic fair choice (DFC)
   ?             3    3

rating input

   JG   KV   ??   DK   ??   ??
range voting (ratings summation)
  5.5    5         2
median ratings
    3    4         2
ranked pairs(cardinal pairwise)
   10    5         2
beatpath(cardinal pairwise)
   10    5         2

other

   JG   ??   ??   DK   ??   ??
CWO-ER-IRV(whole)
    7              1
CWO-ER-IRV(fractional)
    8              1
CWO-ranked pairs(WV)
    8              1
CWO-ranked ballot plurality
    6              1
minmax(pairwise opposition) with AERLO and ATLO
    4              ?
beatpath(WV) with AERLO and ATLO
    8              ?
beatpath(WV) with strong/weak preference option
  7.5              ?