Method support poll

From electowiki

Method support poll. Anyone with an interest in voting methods is welcome to participate. Do not alter the entries of any other participant. In this context, "supporting" a method means that you would support an effort to adopt this method in the place of a method that you don't "support". If you oppose a method, that means that you might attempt to prevent the adoption of that method, even as a replacement for a method not on your "support" list. There is no need to list every method that you oppose; just those that you think are worth mentioning, i.e. at least somewhat controversial. Feel free to rank your supported methods in order of preference, or supply some other kind of comparison between them. Feel free also to modify your answers at any time; there is no closing date for the poll.

Single winner election methods

Which single-winner election methods do you support for the election of government officials? Unless otherwise indicated, it will be assumed that you support the method for local, state, and federal elections.

  • James Green-Armytage
Support: cardinal pairwise with beatpath, ranked pairs, 
river, or Smith sequential dropping, AWP, CWO-IRV,
ER-IRV(whole), Approval voting, ER-IRV(fractional), IRV
Close to supporting: DMC/RAV, Smith//IRV, CDTT,IRV, Smith//minimax
Oppose: Borda count
Close to opposing: minmax, MMPO, Bucklin, Descending Acquiescing Coalitions
  • Kevin Venzke
In general I prefer methods without favorite betrayal incentive. I 
insist on minimal defense or something similar.
Support: ICA, Approval voting
Close to supporting: Schulze, Tideman, or River (using winning votes 
 or possibly AWP), ER-Bucklin(whole), MAMPO, MDDA
Support for legislatures only: CDTT-Later-no-harm combination methods
Oppose: plurality, IRV, ER-IRV, margins, Borda,
 DSC, rating ballots
  • Juho Laatu
Condorcet: best for contentious elections if burying threat considered not too bad
Minmax(margins): my default reference point, good utility function, strategy resistance 
maybe not that bad
Path based (Schulze etc.) and winning votes: ok but lots of work for small 
improvements/changes (that are not all positive)
Pairwise comparison methods enhanced with additional approval or rating information: ok as well if 
not too complex for the voters
Approval: clean method and at least some improvement to the commonly user 
Best IRV methods (if pairwise comparison based methods are out of question)
Close to supporting: Two round system (not that bad for multiparty countries)
Not supporting: Rating based methods (maybe not feasible for contentious elections like the 
government official elections of this query, but good for non-contentious elections)
Plurality (except that it is ok for two party countries IF they want to stay 
that way)
Regional winner gets all votes of that region
Borda and many other ("more heuristic") methods
  • David Gamble
 Support: IRV
 Close to supporting:Condorcet- any completion method, top-two runoff.
 An improvement on Plurality: Approval voting, Bucklin, Range voting.
 Close to opposing: Borda.
 Oppose: Plurality, the use of single seat methods in multi-member districts.
  • Mike Ossipoff
Support: SSD, and Methods that meet FBC. These include Approval, Range Voting, MDDA, MDDB,
MDD, ER-Bucklin(whole), and MAMPO.

Oppose: methods other than SSD that don't meet FBC

(I'm referring to what I'd support or propose when a proposal is being chosen, not what I'd
support or oppose after it has been put to the public).

Support: Approval voting, Approval-Condorcet Hybrids, Condorcet//Approval and variants (e.g.,
Improved Condorcet Approval).
Close to supporting: Condorcet - any completion method, provided the result is a member
of the Schwartz set.
Close to opposing: Borda
Oppose: Plurality, Random Ballot

Legislative election methods

Which legislative (multi-winner) election methods do you support for the election of government officials? Unless otherwise indicated, it will be assumed that you support the method for local, state, and federal elections.

  • James Green-Armytage
Support: CPO-STV, single transferable vote
Close to opposing: Cumulative voting, limited voting, SNTV
Conditional support: Support party list as a transitional system in some cases where 
infrastructure is limited, and where a large part of the population lacks the numerical 
literacy skills need for an STV vote.
  • Kevin Venzke
Support: open party list (approval component), closed party list, 
possibly a proportional approval scheme
  • Juho Laatu
Open party list enhanced with hierarchical structure
Open party list
STV (non-party-based votes are both good and bad)
Regional representation (various styles to complement other methods)
Close to supporting: Closed party list, CPO-STV (complexity problems)
Not supporting: Two party methods (ok if kept intentionally, not just because of fear of 
changes or to stay in power)
  • David Gamble
Support: single transferable vote, CPO-STV.
Close to supporting: Any other proportional method - open party list,
 closed party list, semi-open party list, MMP.
Improvement on single seats methods for multi-member
bodies:SNTV, Limited vote, Cumulative voting.
Oppose: Single seat methods for multi-member bodies in single 
 seats,single seat methods in multi-member districts.

See also