Quadratic voting: Difference between revisions
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Quadratic voting is based upon [[Market (economics)|market principles]], where each voter is given a [[budget]] of vote credits that they have the personal decisions and delegation to spend in order to influence the outcome of a range of decisions. If a participant has a strong support for or against a specific decision, additional votes could be allocated to proportionally demonstrate the voter's support. A vote [[pricing]] rule determines the cost of additional votes, with each vote becoming increasingly more expensive. By increasing voter [[credit]] costs, this demonstrates an individual's support and interests toward the particular decision.<ref name=PosnerQuadraticVoting>{{Cite web |url=http://ericposner.com/quadratic-voting/ |title=Quadratic voting |last=Posner |first=Eric |date=30 December 2014 |website=ERIC POSNER |language=en-US |access-date=9 October 2019}}</ref> If money is used, it is eventually cycled back to the voters based upon per capita. Both [[w:E Glen Weyl|E Glen Weyl]]<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Weyl |first=E. Glen |date=1 July 2017 |title=The robustness of quadratic voting |journal=Public Choice |language=en |volume=172 |issue=1 |pages=75–107 |doi=10.1007/s11127-017-0405-4 |issn=1573-7101}} (see also [[w:Semantic Scholar|Semantic Scholar]] id 189841584)</ref> and [[w:Steven Lalley|Steven Lalley]]{{when|date=22:00, 22 December 2021 (UTC)}} conducted research in which they claim to demonstrate that this decision-making policy expedites efficiency as the number of voters increases. The simplified formula on how quadratic voting functions is<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/saving-democracy-with-quadratic-equations-1421425742 |title=Saving Democracy With Quadratic Equations |last=Ellenberg |first=Jordan |date=16 January 2015 |work=Wall Street Journal |access-date=19 November 2019|language=en-US|issn=0099-9660}}</ref> |
Quadratic voting is based upon [[Market (economics)|market principles]], where each voter is given a [[budget]] of vote credits that they have the personal decisions and delegation to spend in order to influence the outcome of a range of decisions. If a participant has a strong support for or against a specific decision, additional votes could be allocated to proportionally demonstrate the voter's support. A vote [[pricing]] rule determines the cost of additional votes, with each vote becoming increasingly more expensive. By increasing voter [[credit]] costs, this demonstrates an individual's support and interests toward the particular decision.<ref name=PosnerQuadraticVoting>{{Cite web |url=http://ericposner.com/quadratic-voting/ |title=Quadratic voting |last=Posner |first=Eric |date=30 December 2014 |website=ERIC POSNER |language=en-US |access-date=9 October 2019}}</ref> If money is used, it is eventually cycled back to the voters based upon per capita. Both [[w:E Glen Weyl|E Glen Weyl]]<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Weyl |first=E. Glen |date=1 July 2017 |title=The robustness of quadratic voting |journal=Public Choice |language=en |volume=172 |issue=1 |pages=75–107 |doi=10.1007/s11127-017-0405-4 |issn=1573-7101}} (see also [[w:Semantic Scholar|Semantic Scholar]] id 189841584)</ref> and [[w:Steven Lalley|Steven Lalley]]{{when|date=22:00, 22 December 2021 (UTC)}} conducted research in which they claim to demonstrate that this decision-making policy expedites efficiency as the number of voters increases. The simplified formula on how quadratic voting functions is<ref>{{Cite news |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/saving-democracy-with-quadratic-equations-1421425742 |title=Saving Democracy With Quadratic Equations |last=Ellenberg |first=Jordan |date=16 January 2015 |work=Wall Street Journal |access-date=19 November 2019|language=en-US|issn=0099-9660}}</ref> |
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: cost to the voter = (number of votes)<sup>2</sup>. |
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In quadratic voting, the cost to the voter is equal to the square of the vote's weight. |
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==References== |
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<references /> |
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