Mixed Transferable Voting: Difference between revisions
Simplified step 8; change to method.
(Simplify "use up" step.) |
(Simplified step 8; change to method.) |
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# Seats are divided into two groups: district-based (50%-67%) and at-large (33%-50%). One equal-population district is drawn for each district-based seat.
# There is an open primary in each district, which guarantees and allows 2-
## For instance, a simple primary election method would use choose-one ballots, and the winners (those who progressed to the next steps) would be those who ((got over
# Each candidate pre-rates other candidates on a 0-4 star scale (based on the assumption that they'd save the 5-star rating for themselves). Party-affiliated candidates must give other same-party candidates 3 or 4 stars, and different-party candidates 0-2 stars.
# Ballots list the candidates in the local district, with a write-in line for each party. Write-ins may identify candidates by party and name, or by party and district. Lists of all candidates, and their pre-ratings of each other, are available in polling places.
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# Each ballot is "filled in" with the pre-declared ratings of its chosen favorite candidate. Ballots that choose a party but not an individual candidate are filled in with ratings of 5 stars for every candidate in that party and 0 stars for all others.
# Any candidates who get over 50% of the votes from their local district are seated. Each seated candidate uses up up to one Droop quota of their direct votes. If they have more votes than that, their remaining voting weight will be used up in step 8 or transferred in step 9.
# For each seated partisan candidate who did not use up a full Droop quota, use up the remainder of their quota if possible
#* For instance, say candidates W, X, Y, and Z were from one party; and that W won with 120% of a quota, X won with 70% of a quota, and Y and Z survived with
# All remaining votes are used to fill the remaining seats by some proportional method, with the restriction that any district that does not yet have a winner must get at least one winner.
#* For instance, the underlying method might be ER-STV with fractional transfers (as explained here: [[Single transferable vote#Ways of dealing with equal rankings]]). Note that ER-STV here is chosen to be a familiar method, not an optimal one, as the difference between different methods at this stage is relatively minor.
#* Note that this requires the underlying method to be modified in two minor ways. First, it must guarantee one winner per district (as in Local PR: http://localpr.ca/basics/overview/); and second, there must be
#** A candidate is seated as soon as all the same-district rivals are eliminated, and vice versa.
#** As soon as the number of un-filled seats is no greater than the number of districts without a winner, all candidates from districts with a winner are eliminated.
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* Unlike most MMP methods, voters need vote for only one candidate, who may be local or from another district.
* This method uses delegated transfers (see steps 3, 6, and 10). This allows proportional outcomes (intra-party as well as inter-party) from the simple choose-one ballot.
* There is no party threshold for winning seats; a party can win with just one quota of votes. However, because of the open primary step, parties which don't have at least
Some comments are in order:
* The district-based open primary in step 2 would keep fringe parties — those which can't break 20% support in any district — from winning. However, those voters' votes would not thereby be wasted; they'd be able to choose, and very probably successfully elect, the independent or major-party candidate who comes closest to representing their views.
* If 2/3 of seats are district-based, then a quota would be just under 66% of the votes from the average district. If 1/2 of seats are district-based, then a quota would be under 50%, so there would be no overhang issues.
* Independents would have a fair chance of winning a seat. They could do so by getting over 50% of the local votes, or by getting under 50% locally but the remainder of a full quota of direct write-in votes from other districts. However, merely getting a plurality locally, without votes from other districts, would not suffice.
* Step 8 will tend to prevent overhang seats in most cases, except for parties that only get votes in places where they can narrowly win a district seat. This does leave a possible "dummy list"-type strategy, where the party strategically splits into two; one for candidates who will win district seats with more than a quota and those who will get under 50% of district votes, and another for those who will get over 50% but less than a quota. Note, however, that this strategy is dangerous for candidates on the second list; they will not win seats if they get under 50% in their district, even if they are the plurality winner there. I believe that this danger is serious enough that this strategy will be rare; certainly, it should be less of a problem than under two-ballot MMP.
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