Chicken dilemma: Difference between revisions
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Replace dead-end link to ICT with a link to Smith//IRV as both are in the category in question
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# Some voting systems, such as approval voting, ignore the problem. Perhaps the assumption here is that it will be impossible to organize a defection without prompting a retaliation, and thus that both sides will prefer to cooperate. ("Mutual assured destruction"?)
# Some voting systems, such as [[Majority Choice Approval]], try to exploit the fact that each faction is not a single coordinated entity, but a group of individual voters. The idea is that if a small number of voters defect, they should be ignored; hopefully, in that situation, majority cooperation will be a stable strategy.
# Other voting systems, such as [[
# [[Reciprocal Score Voting]] addresses the problem by explicitly rewarding reciprocal cooperation and punishing the defecting sides. Whichever subfaction defects receives no support from the other faction, even if it's larger. The only way to maximize the odds of winning is by cooperating as much as possible with similar factions.
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