Arrow's impossibility theorem: Difference between revisions
→Systems which claim to evade Arrow's Criteria: Saying that all systems have some bad feature is not specific enough. It is about strategic voting.
(The loopholes in Arrow's theorem were closed by Gibbard. See my comment on the Talk page.) |
Dr. Edmonds (talk | contribs) (→Systems which claim to evade Arrow's Criteria: Saying that all systems have some bad feature is not specific enough. It is about strategic voting.) |
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==Systems which claim to evade Arrow's Criteria==
Some activists believe that Arrow's theorem only applies to [[Ordinal Voting|ordinal voting]] and not [[cardinal voting]]. They point out that that it is technically possible for several cardinal systems to pass all three fairness criteria. The typical example is [[score voting]] but there are also several [[Multi-Member System |multi-winner systems]] which proport to pass all three of Arrow's original criteria.
However, subsequent social choice theorists have expanded on Arrow's central insight, and applied his ideas more broadly. For example, the [[
▲However, subsequent social choice theorists have expanded on Arrow's central insight, and applied his ideas more broadly. For example, [[W:Gibbard's theorem|Gibbard's theorem]] (published in 1973) holds that any deterministic process of collective decision making will have at least one undesirable characteristic.
==See also==
*[[Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem]]
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