Talk:Distributed Score Voting: Difference between revisions
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Aldo Tragni (talk | contribs) No edit summary |
Psephomancy (talk | contribs) (add signatures) |
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On your criteria table, you say that DSV passes the participation criterion while failing the consistency criterion. These two criteria are mathematically equivalent in single winner elections so if your method fails consistency it must also fail participation. Condorcet methods are also incompatible with the participation, favorite betrayal, and IIA criteria, thus DSS must fail favorite betrayal and IIA as well. I'm not sure about some of the other criteria that you claim DSV passes, though the number of criteria that you got wrong already puts into question the validity of the entire table. [[User:ParkerFriedland ]], 00:29, February 8, 2020
: Could you give me a reference to the proof that consistency and participation are equivalent? To my knowledge, [[Descending Acquiescing Coalitions]] passes participation but not consistency since, to quote [[w:Consistency criterion]],
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- participation criterion, consistency criterion, favorite betrayal criterion: you are right, they are not satisfied.
- IIA: this is particular because two candidates X and Y who aren't part of the Smith set are simply excluded (therefore the interests of the group on X with respect to Y aren't evaluated). The interests towards X and Y are evaluated only when they fall into the Smith set and in this case, it can be said that adding an irrelevant candidate, the interests of the group towards X and Y don't change. [[User:Aldo Tragni]], 11:52, February 8, 2020
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