Chicken dilemma: Difference between revisions
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(Point out the relation between the chicken dilemma and the criterion named after it, and fix some grammar.) |
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ICT, [[Symmetrical ICT]], [[MMPO]], MDDTR, [[IRV]], [[Benham's Method|Benham's method]], [[Woodall's method]]
== Notes ==
One direct implication of the chicken dilemma criterion is a spoiler effect. This is because if A drops out of the race, then B becomes a majority's 1st choice and wins in any majority criterion-passing method. Further, there is also usually incentive for Favorite Betrayal, since A-top voters generally benefit from putting B 1st. That would be the case in IRV for:
26 A>B
25 B
49 C
If two A-top voters instead vote B-top, B wins instead of C.
Most advocates of the CD criterion would likely counter that it's a more common issue to encounter CD-type scenarios because of strategic voting rather than honest voting, therefore these are worthy prices to pay for the strategic resistance.
[[Category:Voting system criteria]]
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