Symmetrical ICT: Difference between revisions
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'''Symmetrical ICT''', short for '''Symmetrical Improved Condorcet, Top''' is a voting method designed by Michael Ossipoff. <!-- when? link to EM? --> It is based on Kevin Venzke's concept of "Improved Condorcet", which is a modification of pairwise comparison logic that enables methods to pass the [[favorite betrayal criterion]] at the cost of sometimes failing the [[Condorcet criterion]]. |
'''Symmetrical ICT''', short for '''Symmetrical Improved Condorcet, Top''' is a voting method designed by Michael Ossipoff. <!-- when? link to EM? --> It is based on Kevin Venzke's concept of "Improved Condorcet", which is a modification of pairwise comparison logic that enables methods to pass the [[favorite betrayal criterion]] at the cost of sometimes failing the [[Condorcet criterion]]. |
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However, Symmetrical ICT doesn't actually pass the [[favorite betrayal criterion]]. |
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==Definition== |
==Definition== |
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==Criterion compliances== |
==Criterion compliances== |
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Symmetrical ICT passes |
Symmetrical ICT passes the [[chicken dilemma criterion]]. It fails the [[Condorcet criterion]]. |
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It was intended to pass the [[favorite betrayal criterion]], but doesn't succeed in doing so due to the "(X>Y) > (Y>X)" term in the definition. It is possible that a voter can lower their favorite from the top and thereby make their compromise the only candidate who isn't "beaten." |
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==Notes== |
==Notes== |
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