Talk:Asset voting: Difference between revisions

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<blockquote> Asset always picks a winner or winner set that is in the Smith Set of negotiators' preferences if the negotiators are given enough time to negotiate</blockquote>
<blockquote> Asset always picks a winner or winner set that is in the Smith Set of negotiators' preferences if the negotiators are given enough time to negotiate</blockquote>


I don't see how this could be true, since it's a single-mark ballot and suffers from vote-splitting/center-squeeze. I find it hard to believe that a candidate who received zero votes would win under Asset, even if they are the Condorcet winner and sole member of the Smith set. — [[User:Psephomancy|Psephomancy]]&nbsp;([[User talk:Psephomancy|talk]]) 17:40, 15 December 2019 (UTC)
I don't see how this could be true, since it's a single-mark ballot and suffers from vote-splitting/center-squeeze. I find it hard to believe that [[User:Psephomancy/Three tribes|a candidate who received zero votes]] would win under Asset, even if they are the Condorcet winner and sole member of the Smith set. — [[User:Psephomancy|Psephomancy]]&nbsp;([[User talk:Psephomancy|talk]]) 17:40, 15 December 2019 (UTC)


(I'm not sure how to do a user signature but this is BetterVotingAdvocacy in this paragraph) There are two Smith Sets to consider: the Smith Set of voter preferences (which is what Psephomancy addressed above) and the Smith Set of negotiator preferences (whoever the negotiators can give more votes to than any other winner or winner set.) To explain, if there are four candidates, and the voters' ranked preferences of them are:
: There are two Smith Sets to consider: the Smith Set of voter preferences (which is what Psephomancy addressed above) and the Smith Set of negotiator preferences (whoever the negotiators can give more votes to than any other winner or winner set.) To explain, if there are four candidates, and the voters' ranked preferences of them are:


49 Liberal>Moderate>Conservative>Kim Kardashian
:* 49 Liberal>Moderate>Conservative>Kim Kardashian
10 Moderate
:* 10 Moderate
41 Conservative>Moderate>Liberal>Kim Kardashian
:* 41 Conservative>Moderate>Liberal>Kim Kardashian


The Moderate is the Condorcet winner of voter preferences here. But suppose the voters submit a single-mark ballot, and now the votes are: 49 Liberal, 10 Moderate, 41 Conservative, 0 KK. Let's say the negotiators are corrupt and got paid off to elect KK; then the negotiator preferences now are:
: The Moderate is the Condorcet winner of voter preferences here. But suppose the voters submit a single-mark ballot, and now the votes are: 49 Liberal, 10 Moderate, 41 Conservative, 0 KK. Let's say the negotiators are corrupt and got paid off to elect KK; then the negotiator preferences now are:


49 KK>L>M>C
:* 49 KK>L>M>C
10 KK>M
:* 10 KK>M
41 KK>C>M>L
:* 41 KK>C>M>L


So the Condorcet winner, and sole Smith Set member, for negotiator preferences is KK.
: So the Condorcet winner, and sole Smith Set member, for negotiator preferences is KK. - [[User:BetterVotingAdvocacy]]


== Content from deleted Wikipedia article ==
== Content from deleted Wikipedia article ==

Revision as of 20:21, 15 December 2019

Asset voting or Delegated voting

It's interesting seeing the history of the "Asset voting" page on Wikipedia. It appears as though this is the chronology:

  1. 2008-2009: w:Asset voting is created and nominated for deletion three times (one, two, three) on Wikipedia. The outcome of the first was "keep", but the second and third were both "delete".
  2. December 2009: just before conclusion of the third nomination, two things happen:
    1. w:User:Homunq merged the article into the w:Proxy voting page (see the "Asset voting" section of the 2009 "Proxy voting" Wikipedia article).
    2. an anonymous editor creates Asset voting on Electowiki.
  3. January 2010: w:User:Robert_Philip_Ashcroft deletes the "Asset voting" section, calling it "linkspam"
  4. May 2010: w:User:Homunq fixes the w:Asset voting redirect to point to the "Delegated voting" section of the Wikipedia "Proxy voting" article (where it points today).

It would seem that "w:Delegated voting" is how it is referred to on Wikipedia. That seems like a perfectly cromulent name to me.

I discovered all of this looking when I was replying to a thread on reddit. As I'm about to say there, I think this method is really interesting as a way of dealing with crowded primaries. However, I'd like to use preferred terminology to refer to it, and it appears as though "Delegated voting" is winning out over "Asset voting" as the preferred term. -- RobLa (talk) 04:38, 26 February 2019 (UTC)

"Delegated voting" has lots of meanings, though, including Liquid Democracy, SODA, PLACE, etc. Sounds like Homunq moved it there out of desperation, not because anyone actually calls it that.
Also it's not clear to me why Asset doesn't suffer from center-squeeze effect, since it seems that center candidates with low numbers of votes will be compelled to give them to other candidates nearby. — Psephomancy (talk) 02:49, 2 March 2019 (UTC)

Smith Set

Asset always picks a winner or winner set that is in the Smith Set of negotiators' preferences if the negotiators are given enough time to negotiate

I don't see how this could be true, since it's a single-mark ballot and suffers from vote-splitting/center-squeeze. I find it hard to believe that a candidate who received zero votes would win under Asset, even if they are the Condorcet winner and sole member of the Smith set. — Psephomancy (talk) 17:40, 15 December 2019 (UTC)

There are two Smith Sets to consider: the Smith Set of voter preferences (which is what Psephomancy addressed above) and the Smith Set of negotiator preferences (whoever the negotiators can give more votes to than any other winner or winner set.) To explain, if there are four candidates, and the voters' ranked preferences of them are:
  • 49 Liberal>Moderate>Conservative>Kim Kardashian
  • 10 Moderate
  • 41 Conservative>Moderate>Liberal>Kim Kardashian
The Moderate is the Condorcet winner of voter preferences here. But suppose the voters submit a single-mark ballot, and now the votes are: 49 Liberal, 10 Moderate, 41 Conservative, 0 KK. Let's say the negotiators are corrupt and got paid off to elect KK; then the negotiator preferences now are:
  • 49 KK>L>M>C
  • 10 KK>M
  • 41 KK>C>M>L
So the Condorcet winner, and sole Smith Set member, for negotiator preferences is KK. - User:BetterVotingAdvocacy

Content from deleted Wikipedia article

Asset voting or candidate proxy is a voting system which provides proportional representation by allowing all candidates to negotiate the outcome, using the votes cast for them as proxies in subsequent rounds. It is unconventional in the sense that not only voters, but also candidates, can directly affect the outcome.

Candidates may use, distribute, or redistribute votes they received in the election, negotiating with each other to put together a coalition of enough votes to win office. This was proposed in a pamphlet published by Charles Dodgson (Lewis Carroll) in 1884.[1] Though famous for his Alice stories, Dodgson was also a mathematician who pioneered voting theory.[2] The mathematical economist, Duncan Black, analysed his work and described the process: candidates receiving votes may treat them as "if they were their own private property" for purposes of creating proportional representation.[3] The term "asset voting" for this was coined by Warren D. Smith of the Center for Range Voting in 2004[4]. Mike Ossipoff (in 2000) and Forrest Simmons (in 2002) earlier referred to a similar idea as "candidate proxy".[5][6]

This voting system may be used as a model to coordinate multiple heterogenous autonomous systems which have a mission with multiple objectives. The autonomous systems are allowed to influence the weights assigned to each objective. Results from a simulation demonstrated a level of overall mission success comparable to that obtained in an ideal centralised mechanism.[7]

References

  1. ↑ Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, Francine F. Abeles (2001). The Political Pamphlets and Letters of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson and Related Pieces. Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia. ISBN 0930326148.
  2. ↑ Duncan Black, Iain McLean, Alistair McMillan, Burt L. Monroe, Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (1996). A Mathematical Approach to Proportional Representation. Boston: Kluwer. ISBN 0792396200.CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  3. ↑ Duncan Black (May 1969), "Lewis Carroll and the Theory of Games" (PDF), The American Economic Review, 59 (2): 206–210
  4. ↑ Warren D. Smith. "Asset voting – an interesting and very simple multiwinner voting system". The Center for Range Voting. Retrieved 29 May 2008.
  5. ↑ Yahoo! Groups
  6. ↑ "Candidate Proxy Methods". Election Methods mailing list. 2 Dec 2002.
  7. ↑ "The coordination of multiple autonomous systems using information theoretic political science voting models" (PDF). 2006 IEEE/SMC International Conference on System of Systems Engineering. IEEE. 24–26 April 2006. Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)CS1 maint: date and year (link) CS1 maint: date format (link)
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