Talk:Condorcet paradox: Difference between revisions
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If the 11 supporters of A really had a second choice and it was B or C using IRV… same result. |
If the 11 supporters of A really had a second choice and it was B or C using IRV… same result. |
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However, IRV would elect A if 3 supporters moved over to C (voter betrayal |
However, IRV would elect A if 3 supporters moved over to C (voter betrayal works). Obviously, facing defeat, A has every reason to try, but supporters of A may not. Rather than do that calculated 3 vote move to make a tie, supporters of A should only need to change 3 of their votes to A>C. No betrayal. |
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3 A>C |
3 A>C |
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5 C>B |
5 C>B |
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It's a paradox. It wasn't before, but it is now. And based on these votes, C |
It's a paradox. It wasn't before, but it is now. And based on these votes, C now has a right to be in it to win it. This is more a vote to help C, than it is a vote to help A. Besides, there are more guaranteed ways for A to win. Just wrestle 1 vote away from B>A and make it A>B, or turn 1 vote by C>B into C>A>B. Candidates need to prove they are better than the rest. That’s what voters want to see in an election. I think if you end up with a paradox, don't make it into something it's not. Call it a tie and break it in the fairest possible way. |
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[[User:RalphInOttawa|RalphInOttawa]] ([[User talk:RalphInOttawa|talk]]) 17:28, 14 December 2023 (UTC) |
[[User:RalphInOttawa|RalphInOttawa]] ([[User talk:RalphInOttawa|talk]]) 17:28, 14 December 2023 (UTC) |