Talk:Condorcet paradox: Difference between revisions

Content added Content deleted
Line 12: Line 12:


If the 11 supporters of A really had a second choice and it was B or C using IRV… same result.
If the 11 supporters of A really had a second choice and it was B or C using IRV… same result.
However, IRV would elect A if 3 supporters moved over to C (voter betrayal to succeed). Obviously, facing defeat, A has every reason to try, but supporters of A may not. Rather than do that calculated 3 vote move to make a tie, supporters of A should only need to change 3 of their votes to A>C.
However, IRV would elect A if 3 supporters moved over to C (voter betrayal to succeed). Obviously, facing defeat, A has every reason to try, but supporters of A may not. Rather than do that calculated 3 vote move to make a tie, supporters of A should only need to change 3 of their votes to A>C. No betrayal.

3 A>C


8 A
8 A

3 A>C


7 B>A
7 B>A
Line 22: Line 22:
5 C>B
5 C>B


It's a paradox. It wasn't before, but it is now. And based on these votes, C deserves to be in the conversation. The real focus should be on voting. All A needs to win is one more vote. Get 1 vote from B>A to become A>B, or 1 vote from C>B to become C>A>B. Candidates need to prove they are better than the rest. That’s what voters want to see in an election.
It's a paradox. It wasn't before, but it is now. And based on these votes, C deserves to be in the conversation. A shouldn't even be looking for a tie. All A needs is one more vote. Get 1 vote from B>A to become A>B, or 1 vote from C>B to become C>A>B. Candidates need to prove they are better than the rest. That’s what voters want to see in an election. I think if you find a paradox, accept it as a tie.

I think if you find a paradox, accept it as a tie. Give all the candidates the right incentive to go out and get their own votes.


[[User:RalphInOttawa|RalphInOttawa]] ([[User talk:RalphInOttawa|talk]]) 17:28, 14 December 2023 (UTC)
[[User:RalphInOttawa|RalphInOttawa]] ([[User talk:RalphInOttawa|talk]]) 17:28, 14 December 2023 (UTC)