Talk:IRV Prime
Hello, Condorcet and Later-no-harm are incompatible - see proof in Woodall.[1] Could you run your method through the example provided there and update the article? Kristomun (talk) 09:12, 31 July 2021 (UTC)
So if you look at Woodall's full paper, he does not say they're incompatible:
In general, CONDORCET is incompatible with LATER-NO-HELP, LATER-NO-HARM, MONO-RAISE-DELETE, MONO-SUB-PLUMP and, in the presence of PLURALITY, MONO-ADD-TOP.
"in general" --Marcosb (talk) 22:39, 3 August 2021 (UTC)
Arrow/IIA
As I understand it, the reference to satisfying Arrow's theorem is meant to imply that the method satisfies IIA. But I don't think that's possible.
In a Condorcet cycle like this:
35: A>B>C 30: B>C>A 25: C>A>B
Who wins in IRV Prime? If it's A, then eliminating B (irrelevant candidate) should make C win by majority rule. If it's B, then eliminating C makes A win; and if it's C, then eliminating A makes B win. I may be missing something, though! :-) Kristomun (talk) 22:22, 31 July 2021 (UTC)
Running through the IRV-Prime steps, first we do classic IRV, which eliminates C & finds winners={A}: A: 60 B: 30
We now see if any candidate can win against A (we know B can't), i.e. WinnersPrime={C}: C: 55 A: 35
And as such C is the winner in IRV-Prime; this is a classic case of A=Rock, B=Scissors, C=Paper; if I phrase it to you as "suppose B & C voters were to go up against A: which candidate should they stand behind?"
--Marcosb (talk) 22:39, 3 August 2021 (UTC)
- ↑ D R Woodall, "Monotonicity and Single-Seat Election Rules", Voting matters, Issue 6, 1996