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Standard Vote does IRV first (2 or 3 times) and pairwise comparisons second (only between runoff winners).

Standard Vote (abbreviated as SV) is an election vote-counting method that chooses a single candidate by using ranked ballots and the sequential elimination of lowest counting candidates in two or three runoffs. This addition to IRV addresses the unfairness inherent in a single runoff voting system, by identifying when the runner-up has a spoiler effect on the election and doing something about it.

This method modifies Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) by adding a second and possibly a third runoff with later-no-harm safeguards for runoff winners. It further modifies simple IRV by allowing the voter to mark more than one candidate at the same ranking level. These additions improve on simple IRV by: making this system more monotonic (Monotonicity), reducing the failure rate for the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), eliminating Center-squeeze, and making the practice of Favorite Betrayal unnecessary.

Plural Voting: IRV’s plural voting issue is why I made Standard Vote. That issue is about voters whose first choice is for the runner-up and because of that they never get the chance for their lesser choices to count like everyone else that loses. It appears that some voters who lose get two or more votes and some get only one. It’s not fair to voters. It is also unfair to candidates who never get those votes. Standard Vote fixes the plural voting problem by using multiple runoffs.

A better ballot: Voters cast a more full and more honest opinion than IRV by allowing a voter the opportunity to indicate two or more candidates are tied. Standard Vote keeps IRV’s principle of later no harm by ensuring a voter’s lesser preference never causes their more preferred preference to lose. By giving voters up to five choices on a ballot, voters don’t have to guess which one candidate has a chance to beat the one candidate they don’t want.

Greater fairness: Keeping the simple parts of IRV and adding greater fairness creates a better voting system. Popular and successful negative election campaign strategies used in IRV and First Past the Post will not work. Standard Vote fixes the spoiler effect, center squeeze and voter betrayal. A candidate trying to win is left with only one campaign strategy for success. That’s to promote themselves as better than everybody else. That is all voters have ever wanted candidates to do.

Additional runoffs: Because there will be one or two additional runoffs, this process must decide which runoff winner is better. In the spirit of later-no-harm, repeating runoff winners are elected (steps 5 and 8) and different winners will be compared one on one (in steps 6, 9 and 10). In the event of a tie, the earlier runoff winner will be considered better than a later winner.

Description

The number of preferences could be more or less than five. But that may be about as far as any voter will go and still be happy with the result. The Google spreadsheet demonstrator (link below) has five levels of ranking which makes it possible to compare apples to apples with some other voting systems.

Ballots are collected and recorded.

There are up to eleven steps needed to find the best and fairest result

Step 1: When a voter opines that candidate A is equally preferred to candidate B, it is important that the votes are not split in a counting. Only one of the equal candidates gets those votes first. To be fair, who gets these votes first must be settled by random draw. When an elimination round in a runoff results in a tie, it’s a tie. When the final round in a runoff results in a tie, it’s a tie. To be fair, a tie must be broken by a random draw that is separate from the draw for equally preferred. When Standard Vote finds a cyclical tie, it’s a tie which must be broken by a random draw separate from draws for equally preferred and elimination.

Step 2: By allowing voters to vote candidate A equal to candidate B, the voters don’t split the vote by accident. In the spirit of one voter one vote, IRV makes each voter decide. Standard Vote makes these tied votes all go the same way first, and when that candidate loses, the votes go the other way second. That’s runoff voting at work in two different ways. Standard Vote is more fair to the candidates.

Step 3: The first runoff gives a normal IRV result. It’s later-no-harm for candidates. As for the issue of plural voting, the voters having voted for the runner-up as their first preference are the only voters who have lost and not had their lesser preferences counted. Stop here and it’s not the same playing field for all candidates and all voters. it’s not fair.

Step 4: The runner-up in the first runoff is eliminated in the first round of the second runoff. This gives the voters who voted for the runner-up as their first preference a fair chance for the rest of their vote to count. That’s the only reason why there is a second runoff.

Step 5: If the first runoff winner repeats as the second runoff winner, the first / second runoff winner is elected. Win two runoffs and you’re in.

Step 6: When the second runoff gives a different result, the voters who voted for the first runoff winner as their first preference have now lost. This result shows that a spoiler effect was at work in the first runoff. In the spirit of later-no-harm, winning the second runoff is not enough. It is fair to elect the first runoff winner if they are better than the second runoff winner.

Step 7: To be fair, the third runoff gives the voters who voted for the first runoff winner as their first preference the chance for their lesser preferences to count in the same way as the first runoff’s runner-up in step 4. This application of fairness is the only reason why there is a third runoff.

Step 8: If the second runoff winner repeats as the third runoff winner, the second / third runoff winner is elected. Here, as in step 5, having the same result is enough. Win two runoffs and you’re in.

Step 9: When the third runoff gives a different result, it shows that a spoiler effect was at work in the second runoff. Here, as in step 6, winning the runoff is not enough. It is fair to elect the second runoff winner if they are better than the third runoff winner.

Step 10: Completing the circle of comparisons, it is fair to elect the third runoff winner if they are also better than the first runoff winner.

Step 11: It’s a cyclical tie. It does not matter that a runoff winner has: the most approval; the biggest margin in winning its runoff; or the most votes in winning its runoff. Using those conditions to break a tie is an invitation to vote strategically. Shut that door. A tie is a tie. It must be settled by random draw.

Proof of concept

Here's a shared link to a spreadsheet demonstrator (10 candidates, 1-5 picks, 200 voting rows. Note: you need to be signed on to a Google Account).

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1UR7yJyN3XYszE0LYRe9J-RE1YbEdOHvuq1X2-LOaEac/edit#gid=664199959

As of April 2024 I've made an Excel workbook for Excel users (10 candidates, 1-5 picks and 50 voting rows):

https://onedrive.live.com/edit?id=7D93452D5E5AF617!sd3058ae1ff854d99ab8d1d5761a980c1&resid=7D93452D5E5AF617!sd3058ae1ff854d99ab8d1d5761a980c1&cid=7d93452d5e5af617&ithint=file%2Cxlsx&redeem=aHR0cHM6Ly8xZHJ2Lm1zL3gvYy83ZDkzNDUyZDVlNWFmNjE3L0VlR0tCZE9GXzVsTnE0MGRWMkdwZ01FQnZrZnRMUm9EdXNCMEhybVhzaFpaT1E_ZT0wS0NmRXI&migratedtospo=true&wdo=2

Examples comparing SV to IRV

This example shows a paradoxical tie. To be fair, SV gives each candidate an equal chance of election.

4 A>B

3 B>C

2 C>A

IRV elects A. SV decides who wins a three way tie (step 11).

The next example shows how Standard Vote does not suffer from center-squeeze.

4 A>C

3 B>C

2 C

IRV elects A. SV elects Candidate C (step 8).

The following example demonstrates that favorite betrayal is not necessary.

4 A>C

3 B>C

2 C>B

IRV elects B. SV elects C (step 8). No need to turn 2 A>C into 2 C>A.

The 4th example illustrates the system doing a lot better than IRV at not failing monotonicity.

8 A

5 B>A

4 C>B

IRV and SV elect B.

When 2 supporters of A change their votes to C (favorite betrayal):

6 A

2 C

5 B>A

4 C>B

IRV elects A. SV decides who wins the three way tie (step 11).

Using SV, the same result can be produced by simply having the 2 supporters of A add C to their ballots.

6 A

2 A>C

5 B>A

4 C>B

IRV elects B. SV decides who wins in the three way tie (step 11).

@@ Line 1: / Line 1: @@
+'''Standard Vote does IRV first (2 or 3 times) and pairwise comparisons second (only between runoff winners).'''
-'''Standard Vote''' (abbreviated as '''SV''') is an election vote-counting method that chooses a single candidate by using ranked ballots and the sequential elimination of lowest counting candidates in two or three runoffs. Thereby addressing the unfairness of a single runoff voting system by identifying when the runner-up has a [[spoiler|spoiler effect]] on the election and doing something about it.
+Standard Vote (abbreviated as SV) is an election vote-counting method that chooses a single candidate by using ranked ballots and the sequential elimination of lowest counting candidates in two or three runoffs. This addition to IRV  addresses the unfairness inherent in a single runoff voting system, by identifying when the runner-up has a spoiler effect on the election and doing something about it.
-This method modifies [[Instant-Runoff Voting|instant runoff voting]] (IRV) by adding a second and possibly a third runoff with [[later-no-harm]] safeguards for runoff winners. It further modifies simple IRV by allowing the voter to mark more than one candidate at the same ranking level. These additions claim to improve on simple IRV by: more fairly counting a voter's honest opinion, making this system more monotonic ([[Monotonicity]]), reducing the failure rate for the [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives|Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives]] (IIA), eliminating [[Center-squeeze]], and making the practice of [[Favorite Betrayal]] unnecessary.
+This method modifies Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) by adding a second and possibly a third runoff with later-no-harm safeguards for runoff winners. It further modifies simple IRV by allowing the voter to mark more than one candidate at the same ranking level. These additions improve on simple IRV by: making this system more monotonic (Monotonicity), reducing the failure rate for the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), eliminating Center-squeeze, and making the practice of Favorite Betrayal unnecessary.
-== Description ==
-Voters rank the candidates using as many ranking levels as there are candidates, or to a limit as specified by the electing authority. The Google spreadsheet demonstrator (link below) has five levels of ranking which makes it possible to compare apples to apples with some other voting systems.
+'''Plural Voting:''' IRV’s plural voting issue is why I made Standard Vote. That issue is about voters whose first choice is for the runner-up and because of that they never get the chance for their lesser choices to count like everyone else that loses. It appears that some voters who lose get two or more votes and some get only one. It’s not fair to voters. It is also unfair to candidates who never get those votes. Standard Vote fixes the plural voting problem by using multiple runoffs.
-This method begins with the ballots being collected and recorded. Equal rankings on ballots are turned into ranked choices based on a random ordering of candidates. This is followed by the first runoff. Candidates are eliminated one at a time in each runoff, with the vote counts of the final two candidates compared (effectively pairwise) to identify a winner and a runner-up. The method continues with a second runoff, in which the first runoff's runner-up is immediately withdrawn. The voter's preferences trapped behind/under the runner-up are now countable like those of other voters whose first preference has lost. This identifies a second runoff winner. If the first winner repeats as the second winner, they are elected and the election is over.
+'''A better ballot:''' Voters cast a more full and more honest opinion than IRV by allowing a voter the opportunity to indicate two or more candidates are tied. Standard Vote keeps IRV’s principle of later no harm by ensuring a voter’s lesser preference never causes their more preferred preference to lose. By giving voters up to five choices on a ballot, voters don’t have to guess which one candidate has a chance to beat the one candidate they don’t want.
-If no one is elected, a pairwise comparison is made of the first and second winners. The first winner will be elected if the second winner can do no better than a tie. Failing that, a third runoff occurs in which the first runoff's winner is immediately withdrawn. The votes previously trapped behind/under the first winner in both runoffs are now countable like those of other voters whose first preference has lost. It's the same fairness that supporters of the runner-up received in the second runoff. This identifies a third winner. If the second winner repeats as the third winner, they are elected and the election is over.
+'''Greater fairness:''' Keeping the simple parts of IRV and adding greater fairness creates a better voting system. Popular and successful negative election campaign strategies used in IRV and First Past the Post will not work. Standard Vote fixes the spoiler effect, center squeeze and voter betrayal. A candidate trying to win is left with only one campaign strategy for success. That’s to promote themselves as better than everybody else. That is all voters have ever wanted candidates to do.
-If no one has been elected, a pairwise comparison is made of the second and third winners. The second winner will be elected if the third winner can do no better than a tie. Failing all of the above, the third winner is compared pairwise with the first winner. The third winner will be elected if they beat the first winner. Finally, with no one elected, the result is a paradoxical tie between the three runoff winners. One of them will be elected by "random draw".
+'''Additional runoffs:''' Because there will be one or two additional runoffs, this process must decide which runoff winner is better. In the spirit of later-no-harm, repeating runoff winners are elected (steps 5 and 8) and different winners will be compared one on one (in steps 6, 9 and 10). In the event of a tie, the earlier runoff winner will be considered better than a later winner.
-Here's a shared link to the demonstrator (10 candidates, 1-5 picks, 200 voting rows) (you need to be signed on to a Google Account):
+'''Description'''
-https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/102gdd19Ig6C6511mN8d_7qMMvd1-EDTRJziFd3-rqUM/edit#gid=664199959
+The number of preferences could be more or less than five. But that may be about as far as any voter will go and still be happy with the result.  The Google spreadsheet demonstrator (link below) has five levels of ranking which makes it possible to compare apples to apples with some other voting systems.
-if you prefer small, this links to the demo in a cell phone format (limited to 20 voting rows), bare bones with no intro, no examples and no report.
+Ballots are collected and recorded.
-https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1XGUOdDBymcQzJN-8z9izmRB2KugjZgsCoJYG_hSXfd4/edit#gid=664199959
+'''There are up to eleven steps needed to find the best and fairest result'''
-== Tie breakers ==
-[[Random Voter Hierarchy]] (RVH) is used for each "random draw". Ideally these values are determined at the "instant" the counting begins, giving candidates and voters nothing to apply a strategy to. If two or more candidates have the same rank on any number of ballots, this tie is re-ranked by "random draw" en masse. All votes will fall the same way throughout all elimination rounds in all runoffs (all occurrences of A=B will either all count as A>B or all count as B>A). All ties encountered during elimination rounds will be decided by a different "random draw". This will cause ties between candidates to be decided in the same candidate's favor throughout all elimination rounds. In pairwise ties between runoff winners, the earlier winner's count takes precedence over a subsequent winner's count. In the scenario of the paradoxical tie, the candidate to be elected will be decided by yet another different "random draw".
+'''Step 1:''' When a voter opines that candidate A is equally preferred to candidate B, it is important that the votes are not split in a counting. Only one of the equal candidates gets those votes first. To be fair, who gets these votes first must be settled by random draw. When an elimination round in a runoff results in a tie, it’s a tie. When the final round in a runoff results in a tie, it’s a tie. To be fair, a tie must be broken by a random draw that is separate from the draw for equally preferred. When Standard Vote finds a cyclical tie, it’s a tie which must be broken by a random draw separate from draws for equally preferred and elimination.
-== Examples ==
-The paradoxical tie. Each candidate has an equal claim to be elected. In this example, one of the three candidates will be elected by "random draw".
+'''Step 2:''' By allowing voters to vote candidate A equal to candidate B, the voters don’t split the vote by accident. In the spirit of one voter one vote, IRV makes each voter decide. Standard Vote makes these tied votes all go the same way first, and when that candidate loses, the votes go the other way second. That’s runoff voting at work in two different ways. Standard Vote is more fair to the candidates.
+'''Step 3:''' The first runoff gives a normal IRV result. It’s later-no-harm for candidates. As for the issue of plural voting, the voters having voted for the runner-up as their first preference are the only voters who have lost and not had their lesser preferences counted. Stop here and it’s not the same playing field for all candidates and all voters. it’s not fair.
+'''Step 4:''' The runner-up in the first runoff is eliminated in the first round of the second runoff. This gives the voters who voted for the runner-up as their first preference a fair chance for the rest of their vote to count. That’s the only reason why there is a second runoff.
+'''Step 5:''' If the first runoff winner repeats as the second runoff winner, the first / second runoff winner is elected. Win two runoffs and you’re in.
+'''Step 6:''' When the second runoff gives a different result, the voters who voted for the first runoff winner as their first preference have now lost. This result shows that a spoiler effect was at work in the first runoff. In the spirit of later-no-harm, winning the second runoff is not enough. It is fair to elect the first runoff winner if they are better than the second runoff winner.
+'''Step 7:''' To be fair, the third runoff gives the voters who voted for the first runoff winner as their first preference the chance for their lesser preferences to count in the same way as the first runoff’s runner-up in step 4. This application of fairness is the only reason why there is a third runoff.
+'''Step 8:''' If the second runoff winner repeats as the third runoff winner, the second / third runoff winner is elected. Here, as in step 5, having the same result is enough. Win two runoffs and you’re in.
+'''Step 9:''' When the third runoff gives a different result, it shows that a spoiler effect was at work in the second runoff. Here, as in step 6, winning the runoff is not enough. It is fair to elect the second runoff winner if they are better than the third runoff winner.
+'''Step 10:''' Completing the circle of comparisons, it is fair to elect the third runoff winner if they are also better than the first runoff winner.
+'''Step 11:''' It’s a cyclical tie. It does not matter that a runoff winner has: the most approval; the biggest margin in winning its runoff; or the most votes in winning its runoff. Using those conditions to break a tie is an invitation to vote strategically. Shut that door. A tie is a tie. It must be settled by random draw.
+'''Proof of concept'''
+Here's a shared link to a spreadsheet demonstrator (10 candidates, 1-5 picks, 200 voting rows. Note: you need to be signed on to a Google Account).
+https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1UR7yJyN3XYszE0LYRe9J-RE1YbEdOHvuq1X2-LOaEac/edit#gid=664199959
+As of April 2024 I've made an Excel workbook for Excel users (10 candidates, 1-5 picks and 50 voting rows):
+https://onedrive.live.com/edit?id=7D93452D5E5AF617!sd3058ae1ff854d99ab8d1d5761a980c1&resid=7D93452D5E5AF617!sd3058ae1ff854d99ab8d1d5761a980c1&cid=7d93452d5e5af617&ithint=file%2Cxlsx&redeem=aHR0cHM6Ly8xZHJ2Lm1zL3gvYy83ZDkzNDUyZDVlNWFmNjE3L0VlR0tCZE9GXzVsTnE0MGRWMkdwZ01FQnZrZnRMUm9EdXNCMEhybVhzaFpaT1E_ZT0wS0NmRXI&migratedtospo=true&wdo=2
+'''Examples comparing SV to IRV'''
+This example shows a paradoxical tie. To be fair, SV gives each candidate an equal chance of election.
 A>B
@@ Line 32: / Line 67: @@
 C>A
+IRV elects A. SV decides who wins a three way tie (step 11).
-The next example shows how Standard Vote does not suffer from center-squeeze. Candidate C is elected.
+The next example shows how Standard Vote does not suffer from center-squeeze.
 A>C
@@ Line 40: / Line 78: @@
 C
+IRV elects A. SV elects Candidate C (step 8).
-The following example demonstrates that favorite betrayal is not necessary. C wins. 2 A>C turning into 2 C>A is not needed.
+The following example demonstrates that favorite betrayal is not necessary.
 A>C
@@ Line 48: / Line 89: @@
 C>B
+IRV elects B. SV elects C (step 8). No need to turn 2 A>C into 2 C>A.
-The 4th example illustrates the system doing a lot better than IRV at not failing to be monotonic
+The 4th example illustrates the system doing a lot better than IRV at not failing monotonicity.
 A
@@ Line 56: / Line 100: @@
 C>B
+IRV and SV elect B.
-IRV elects B, but when 2 supporters of A change their votes to C (favorite betrayal), A wins. In this improved version of IRV, the original result still elects B, and the new result is a three way tie that will be decided by random draw. Still not monotonic but not the guaranteed win by A. However, the same result is achieved without betrayal, and not failing monotonicity, if those 2 voters had simply added C as a preference, casting A>C.
+When 2 supporters of A change their votes to C (favorite betrayal):
+A
-For those who can’t access a Google Sheets spreadsheet, here are real short descriptions of Standard Vote's eleven step process.
+'''2 C'''
-: Create 3 random lists of the alternatives for use in steps 2, 3, 4, 7 and 11.
+B>A
-: Use the 1st list from step 1 to order shared preferences on ballots.
+C>B
-: Execute a “normal” IRV runoff to identify the 1st winner and a runner-up. Use 2nd list from step 1 to break ties in elimination rounds.
+IRV elects A. SV decides who wins the three way tie (step 11).
-: Execute a 2nd IRV runoff without the runner-up from step 3, identifying a 2nd winner. Use 2nd list from step 1 to break ties.
-: If the same alternative wins both runoffs, elect that alternative.
-: If the 1st winner does not lose to the 2nd winner, one on one, elect the 1st winner.
+Using SV, the same result can be produced by simply having the 2 supporters of A add C to their ballots.
-: Execute a 3rd runoff without the 1st winner from step 3, identifying a 3rd winner. Use 2nd list from step 1 to break ties.
+A
-: If the same alternative wins the 2nd and 3rd runoffs, elect that alternative.
+'''2 A>C'''
-: If the 2nd winner does not lose to the 3rd winner, one on one, elect the 2nd winner.
+B>A
-: If the 3rd winner beats the 1st winner, one on one, elect the 3rd winner.
+C>B
+IRV elects B. SV decides who wins in the three way tie (step 11).
-: Use the third list created in step 1 to elect one of the three runoff winners.