User:RalphInOttawa/Standard Vote: Difference between revisions

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IRV elects B, but when 2 supporters of A change their votes to C (favorite betrayal), A wins. In this improved version of IRV, the original result still elects B, and the new result is a three way tie that will be decided by random draw. Still not monotonic but not the guaranteed win by A. However, the same result is achieved without betrayal, and not failing monotonicity, if those 2 voters had simply added C as a preference, casting A>C.

For those who can’t access my Google Sheets spreadsheet, here are real short descriptions of my eleven steps process.

1: Create 3 random lists of the alternatives for use in steps 2, 3, 4, 7 and 11.

2: Use the 1st list from step 1 to order shared preferences on ballots.

3: Execute a “normal” IRV runoff to identify the 1st winner and a runner-up.

4: Execute a 2nd IRV runoff without the runner-up from step 3, identifying a 2nd winner.

5: If the same alternative wins both runoffs, elect that alternative.

6: If the 1st winner does not lose to the 2nd winner, one on one, elect the 1st winner.

7: Execute a 3rd runoff without the 1st winner from step 3, identifying a 3rd winner.

8: If the same alternative wins the 2nd and 3rd runoffs, elect that alternative.

9: If the 2nd winner does not lose to the 3rd winner, one on one, elect the 2nd winner.

10: If the 3rd winner beats the 1st winner, one on one, elect the 3rd winner.

11: Use the third list created in step 1 to elect one of the three runoff winners.