User talk:BetterVotingAdvocacy/Big page of ideas

Condorcet as Approval, Approval as Condorcet

About your comparisons between Approval and Condorcet: you can go in the opposite direction (i.e. Approval to Condorcet), too, by considering Approval voting a method where each voter decides what the most important pairwise comparison is, puts his approval threshold there, and says that everybody on the approved side of the threshold beats everybody on the non-approved side. Kristomun (talk) 12:31, 25 May 2020 (UTC)

Yeah, I've thought of that, but didn't know quite how to word it. On the Approval voting#Connection to Condorcet methods section, I made clear that Approval voters can always ensure the loser of a matchup loses if they set their thresholds based on their preference in the matchup, but they can only guaranteeably make the winner of the matchup win if the winner majority-beats the loser. Maybe I can make some kind of image/GIF for this, I don't know. BetterVotingAdvocacy (talk) 19:08, 25 May 2020 (UTC)

To sort of extend the thought, Score is where the voter's support margin in each matchup must add up transitively, and the sum can be no greater than 1 vote. In other words, if you give A max support and B 60% support, then you can give B no greater than a 60% margin (0.6 votes pairwise) in support against C. BetterVotingAdvocacy (talk) 00:15, 27 May 2020 (UTC)