Young's method: Difference between revisions
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Young's method is a Condorcet method that elects the candidate that can be made into a Condorcet winner by ignoring as few ballots as possible. It was devised by H. P. Young in 1977.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Young|first=H. P.|date=1977-12-01|title=Extending Condorcet's rule|url=http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0022053177900126|journal=Journal of Economic Theory|language=en|volume=16|issue=2|pages=335–353|doi=10.1016/0022-0531(77)90012-6|issn=0022-0531}}</ref>
Determining the Young winner is complete for parallel access to NP,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Rothe|first=Jörg|last2=Spakowski|first2=Holger|last3=Vogel|first3=Jörg|date=2003-08-01|title=Exact Complexity of the Winner Problem for Young Elections|url=https://arxiv.org/pdf/cs/0112021|journal=Theory of Computing Systems|language=en|volume=36|issue=4|pages=375–386|doi=10.1007/s00224-002-1093-z|issn=1433-0490|via=}}</ref> and thus NP-hard. The method is not summable. In addition, it is [[Monotonicity criterion|monotone]] but fails the [[Smith criterion]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Fishburn|first=Peter C.|date=1977-11-01|title=Condorcet Social Choice Functions|url=https://epubs.siam.org/doi/abs/10.1137/0133030|journal=SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics|volume=33|issue=3|pages=477-479|doi=10.1137/0133030|issn=0036-1399|via=}}</ref>
== Peyton Young ==
{{wikipedia|Peyton Young}}<blockquote>copied from [[wikipedia:Peyton Young]]<ref>The [[#Peyton Young]] section of this article was copied from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Peyton_Young&oldid=965515042 on 2020-08-23</ref></blockquote>'''
Peyton Young was named a fellow of the [[Wikipedia:Econometric Society|Econometric Society]] in 1995, a fellow of the [[Wikipedia:British Academy|British Academy]] in 2007, and a fellow of the [[Wikipedia:American Academy of Arts and Sciences|American Academy of Arts and Sciences]] in 2018. He served as president of the Game Theory Society from 2006–08.[http://www.gametheorysociety.org/membership/officers.html] He has published widely on learning in games, the evolution of social norms and institutions, cooperative game theory, bargaining and negotiation, taxation and cost allocation, political representation, voting procedures, and distributive justice.▼
== Links ==
=== References ===▼
▲'''Hobart Peyton Young''' (born March 9, 1945) is an American game theorist and economist known for his contributions to [[evolutionary game theory]] and its application to the study of institutional and technological change, as well as the theory of learning in games. He is currently centennial professor at the [[London School of Economics]], James Meade Professor of Economics Emeritus at the [[University of Oxford]], professorial fellow at [[Nuffield College]] Oxford, and research principal at the Office of Financial Research at the [[U.S. Department of the Treasury]].
▲Peyton Young was named a fellow of the [[Econometric Society]] in 1995, a fellow of the [[British Academy]] in 2007, and a fellow of the [[American Academy of Arts and Sciences]] in 2018. He served as president of the Game Theory Society from 2006–08.[http://www.gametheorysociety.org/membership/officers.html] He has published widely on learning in games, the evolution of social norms and institutions, cooperative game theory, bargaining and negotiation, taxation and cost allocation, political representation, voting procedures, and distributive justice.
▲== References ==
<references/>
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