Young's method: Difference between revisions
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Young's method is a Condorcet method that elects the candidate that can be made into a Condorcet winner by ignoring as few ballots as possible. It was devised by H. P. Young in 1977.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Young|first=H. P.|date=1977-12-01|title=Extending Condorcet's rule|url=http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0022053177900126|journal=Journal of Economic Theory|language=en|volume=16|issue=2|pages=335–353|doi=10.1016/0022-0531(77)90012-6|issn=0022-0531}}</ref>
Determining the Young winner is complete for parallel access to NP,<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Rothe|first=Jörg|last2=Spakowski|first2=Holger|last3=Vogel|first3=Jörg|date=2003-08-01|title=Exact Complexity of the Winner Problem for Young Elections|url=https://arxiv.org/pdf/cs/0112021|journal=Theory of Computing Systems|language=en|volume=36|issue=4|pages=375–386|doi=10.1007/s00224-002-1093-z|issn=1433-0490|via=}}</ref> and thus NP-hard. The method is not summable. In addition, it is [[Monotonicity criterion|monotone]] but fails the [[Smith criterion]].<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Fishburn|first=Peter C.|date=1977-11-01|title=Condorcet Social Choice Functions|url=https://epubs.siam.org/doi/abs/10.1137/0133030|journal=SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics|volume=33|issue=3|pages=477-479|doi=10.1137/0133030|issn=0036-1399|via=}}</ref>
== Peyton Young ==
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