Chicken dilemma: Difference between revisions

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This scenario has been called the "chicken dilemma" because in many election systems, the two majority subfactions are in a situation that resembles the classic "[[W:Chicken (game)|chicken]]" or "snowdrift" game (especially if voters are not sure which of the two subfactions is larger).

== Definition ==

Below are two definitions of Chicken Dilemma; "CD" and "CD2"

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=== CD ===

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The A voters are the voters who vote A over everyone else. The B voters are the voters who vote B over everyone else. The C voters are the voters who vote C over everyone else.

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====Premise====

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# There are 3 candidates: A, B, and C.

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# The A voters and the B voters, combined, add up to more than half of the voters in the election.

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# The A voters are more numerous than the B voters. The C voters are more numerous than the A voters, and more numerous than the B voters.

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# The A voters vote B over C. The B voters refuse to vote A over anyone.

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# None of the C voters vote A or B over the other.

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==== Requirement ====

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B doesn't win.

=== CD2 ===

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CD is sufficient, as-is, but here is a non-numerical definition:

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The A voters are the voters who vote A over everyone else. The B voters are

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the voters who vote B over everyone else. The C voters are the voters

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who vote C over everyone else.

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'''Premise:'''

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1. There are 3 candidate: A, B, and C.

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2. If the A voters and B voters all voted both A and B over C, then C

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couldn't win.

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3. The ballot set is such that if C withdrew from the election and the

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count, A would win.

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4. The A voters vote B over C.

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5. The B voters don't vote A over anyone.

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'''Requirement:'''

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B doesn't win.

== Analysis ==

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* 45: C>>A=B

== Definition of chicken dilemma criterion ==

=== Formal definition ===

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The A voters are the voters who vote A over everyone else. The B voters are the voters who vote B over everyone else. The C voters are the voters who vote C over everyone else.

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====Premise====

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# There are 3 candidates: A, B, and C.

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# The A voters and the B voters, combined, add up to more than half of the voters in the election.

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# The A voters are more numerous than the B voters. The C voters are more numerous than the A voters, and more numerous than the B voters.

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# The A voters vote B over C. The B voters refuse to vote A over anyone.

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# None of the C voters vote A or B over the other.

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==== Requirement ====

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B doesn't win.

=== Further analysis ===

In the chicken dilemma scenario described in the premise of the Chicken Dilemma Criterion (CD), defined above, if B won, then the B voters would have successfully taken advantage of the A voters' cooperativeness. The A voters wanted to vote both A and B over the candidate disliked by both the A voters and B voters. Thereby they helped {A,B} against the worse candidate. But, with methods that fail CD, the message is "You help, you lose".

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ICT, [[Symmetrical ICT]], [[MMPO]], MDDTR, [[IRV]], [[Benham's Method|Benham's method]], [[Woodall's method]]

Because CD is so simple, such a simple situation, could there be another

Because CD is so simple, such a simple situation, could there be another simple implementation of it?

simple implementation of it?

...maybe one that doesn't speak of numbers of voters in the factions?

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CD is sufficient, as-is, but here is a non-numerical definition:

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== ~~CD2:~~ ==

'''Supporting definition:'''