| Display title | Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives |
| Default sort key | Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives |
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| Page ID | 1778 |
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| Page creator | BetterVotingAdvocacy (talk | contribs) |
| Date of page creation | 07:16, 22 February 2020 |
| Latest editor | RobLa (talk | contribs) |
| Date of latest edit | 09:30, 16 May 2021 |
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Article description: (description)
This attribute controls the content of the description and og:description elements. | Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives (ISDA), also sometimes called Smith-IIA (Smith-Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives), says that if one option (X) wins an election, and a new alternative (Y) is added, X will still win the election if Y is not in the Smith set. ISDA implies Smith and thus Condorcet, since logically speaking, if an ISDA-passing method's winner were not in the Smith set, eliminating everyone outside of the Smith set would have to change the winner. Some Condorcet methods (e.g. Schulze) satisfy ISDA. |
