Majority Judgment: Difference between revisions

From electowiki
Content added Content deleted
(from wp)
 
(Removed multiwinner category as it's not a multiwinner method.)
 
(18 intermediate revisions by 6 users not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
{{Wikipedia}}
'''Majority Judgment''' is a single-winner [[voting system]] proposed by Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki. Voters freely grade each candidate in one of several named ranks, for instance from "excellent" to "bad", and the candidate with the highest [[median]] grade is the winner. If more than one candidate has the same median grade, a tiebreaker is used which sees how "broad" that median grade is. It can be considered as a form of [[Bucklin voting]] which allows equal ranks.

'''Majority Judgment''' is a single-winner [[voting system]] proposed by [[Michel Balinski]] and Rida Laraki.<ref>{{cite book|author= M. Balinski & R. Laraki|year=2010|title=Majority Judgment. |publisher=MIT Press|isbn=978-0-262-01513-4}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=de Swart|first=Harrie|date=2021-11-16|title=How to Choose a President, Mayor, Chair: Balinski and Laraki Unpacked|url=https://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00283-021-10124-3|journal=The Mathematical Intelligencer|language=en|doi=10.1007/s00283-021-10124-3|issn=0343-6993}}</ref> Voters freely [[Score voting|score]] each candidate in one of several named qualities, for instance from "excellent" to "bad". Each quality is associated with a numeric score and the candidate with the highest median score is the winner. If more than one candidate has the same median grade, a tiebreaker is used which sees how "broad" that median grade is. Majority Judgment can be considered as a form of [[Bucklin voting]] which allows equal ranks.


==Voting process==
==Voting process==
Line 9: Line 11:


== Satisfied and failed criteria ==
== Satisfied and failed criteria ==
Majority Judgment voting satisfies the [[majority criterion]] for rated ballots, the [[mutual majority criterion]], the [[monotonicity criterion]], [[reversal symmetry]], and [[later-no-harm|later-no-help]]. Assuming that ratings are given independently of other candidates, it satisfies the [[independence of clones criterion]] and the [[independence of irrelevant alternatives|independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion]]<ref>Badinski and Laraki, ''Majority Judgment'', p. 217</ref> - although this latter criterion is incompatible with the majority criterion if voters shift their judgments in order to express their [[preferential voting|preferences]] between the available candidates.
Majority Judgment voting satisfies the [[Majority criterion for rated ballots|majority criterion for rated ballots]], and also a weak form of the [[mutual majority criterion]] (a majority giving only and all of their preferred candidates perfect grades will win), the [[monotonicity criterion]], and [[later-no-harm|later-no-help]]. Assuming that ratings are given independently of other candidates, it satisfies the [[independence of clones criterion]] and the [[independence of irrelevant alternatives|independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion]]<ref>Badinski and Laraki, ''Majority Judgment'', p. 217</ref> - although this latter criterion is incompatible with the majority criterion if voters shift their judgments in order to express their [[preferential voting|preferences]] between the available candidates.


It fails the [[Condorcet criterion]],<ref>Strategically in the [[strong Nash equilibrium]], MJ passes the Condorcet criterion.</ref> [[later-no-harm]],<ref>MJ provides a weaker guarantee similar to LNH: rating another candidate at or below your preferred winner's median rating (as opposed to your own rating for the winner) cannot harm the winner.</ref> [[consistency criterion for voting systems|consistency]], the [[Condorcet method|Condorcet loser criterion]],<ref>Nevertheless, it passes a slightly weakened version, the majority condorcet loser criterion, in which all defeats are by an absolute majority (for instance, if there aren't equal rankings).</ref> and the [[participation criterion]].<ref>It can only fail the participation criterion when, among other conditions, the new ballot rates both of the candidates in question on the same side of the winning median, and the prior distribution of ratings is more sharply-peaked or irregular for one of the candidates.</ref> It also fails the ranked or preferential [[majority criterion]], which is incompatible with the passed criterion [[independence of irrelevant alternatives]].
It fails the [[Condorcet criterion]],<ref group="nb">Strategically in the [[strong Nash equilibrium]], MJ passes the Condorcet criterion.</ref> [[later-no-harm]],<ref group="nb">MJ provides a weaker guarantee similar to LNH: rating another candidate at or below your preferred winner's median rating (as opposed to your own rating for the winner) cannot harm the winner.</ref> [[Consistency criterion|consistency]], the [[Condorcet method|Condorcet loser criterion]],<ref group="nb">Nevertheless, it passes a slightly weakened version, the majority condorcet loser criterion, in which all defeats are by an absolute majority (for instance, if there aren't equal rankings).</ref> and the [[participation criterion]].<ref group="nb">It can only fail the participation criterion when, among other conditions, the new ballot rates both of the candidates in question on the same side of the winning median, and the prior distribution of ratings is more sharply-peaked or irregular for one of the candidates.</ref> It also fails the ranked or preferential [[majority criterion]], which is incompatible with the passed criterion [[independence of irrelevant alternatives]], and [[reversal symmetry]].


==Example application==
==Example application==
Line 17: Line 19:


If there were four ratings named "Excellent", "Good", "Fair", and "Poor", and each voter assigned four different ratings to the four cities, then the sorted scores would be as follows:
If there were four ratings named "Excellent", "Good", "Fair", and "Poor", and each voter assigned four different ratings to the four cities, then the sorted scores would be as follows:



<table>
<table>


<tr>
<tr>
<td align=right>City</td>
<td align=right>City&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>
<td>
<td>
<table cellpadding=0 width=600 border=0 cellspacing=0>
<table cellpadding=0 width=500 border=0 cellspacing=0>
<tr>
<tr>
<td width=49%>&nbsp;</td>
<td width=49%>&nbsp;</td>
<td width=2% textalign=center>\/</td>
<td width=2% textalign=center></td>
<td width=49%>Median point</td>
<td width=49%>Median point</td>
</tr>
</tr>
Line 37: Line 38:
<td align=right>Nashville</td>
<td align=right>Nashville</td>
<td>
<td>
<table cellpadding=0 width=600 border=0 cellspacing=0>
<table cellpadding=0 width=500 border=0 cellspacing=0>
<tr>
<tr>
<td bgcolor=green width=26%>&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=green width=26%>&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=YellowGreen width=42%></td>
<td bgcolor=YellowGreen width=42%></td>
<td bgcolor=Gold width=32%></td>
<td bgcolor=Gold width=32%></td>
<td bgcolor=red width=0%></td>
</tr>
</tr>
</table>
</table>
Line 51: Line 51:
<td align=right>Chattanooga</td>
<td align=right>Chattanooga</td>
<td>
<td>
<table cellpadding=0 width=600 border=0 cellspacing=0>
<table cellpadding=0 width=500 border=0 cellspacing=0>
<tr>
<tr>
<td bgcolor=green width=15%>&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=green width=15%>&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=YellowGreen width=43%></td>
<td bgcolor=YellowGreen width=43%></td>
<td bgcolor=Gold width=42%></td>
<td bgcolor=Gold width=42%></td>
<td bgcolor=red width=0%></td>
</tr>
</tr>
</table>
</table>
Line 65: Line 64:
<td align=right>Knoxville</td>
<td align=right>Knoxville</td>
<td>
<td>
<table cellpadding=0 width=600 border=0 cellspacing=0>
<table cellpadding=0 width=500 border=0 cellspacing=0>
<tr>
<tr>
<td bgcolor=green width=17%>&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=green width=17%>&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=YellowGreen width=15%></td>
<td bgcolor=YellowGreen width=15%></td>
<td bgcolor=Gold width=26%></td>
<td bgcolor=Gold width=26%></td>
<td bgcolor=red width=42%></td>
<td bgcolor=DarkOrange width=42%></td>
</tr>
</tr>
</table>
</table>
Line 79: Line 78:
<td align=right>Memphis</td>
<td align=right>Memphis</td>
<td>
<td>
<table cellpadding=0 width=600 border=0 cellspacing=0>
<table cellpadding=0 width=500 border=0 cellspacing=0>
<tr>
<tr>
<td bgcolor=green width=42%>&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=green width=42%>&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=YellowGreen width=0%></td>
<td bgcolor=DarkOrange width=58%></td>
<td bgcolor=Gold width=0%></td>
<td bgcolor=red width=58%></td>
</tr>
</tr>
</table>
</table>
Line 98: Line 95:
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>
<td>
<table cellpadding=1 width=600 border=0 cellspacing=1>
<table cellpadding=1 border=0 cellspacing=1>
<tr>
<tr>
<td width=25%>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=green>&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=green>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;Exellent&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;Excellent&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=YellowGreen>&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=YellowGreen>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;Good&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;Good&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=Gold>&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=Gold>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;Fair&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;Fair&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=red>&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=DarkOrange>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;Poor&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;Poor&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>
<td width=50%>&nbsp;</td>
</tr>
</tr>
</table>
</table>
Line 118: Line 114:
</table>
</table>


The medians for Nashville and Chatanooga would be "Good"; for Knoxville, "Fair"; and for Memphis, "Poor". Nashville and Chatanooga are tied, so "Good" ratings would be removed from both. After removing 16% of the votes from each, Chatanooga's median would round down to "Fair", while Nashville would remain at "Good"<ref>After removal, Chatanooga would have 42% of the initial electorate at "Fair", 27% "Good", and 15% "Excellent", while Nashville would have 32% "Fair", 26% "Good", and 26% "Excellent"</ref> and so '''Nashville''' would win.
The median rating for Nashville and Chattanooga is "Good"; for Knoxville, "Fair"; and for Memphis, "Poor". Nashville and Chattanooga are tied, so "Good" ratings have to be removed from both, until their medians become different. After removing 16% "Good" ratings from the votes of each, the sorted ratings are now:


<table>
<table>


<tr>
<tr>
<td align=right>City</td>
<td align=right>City&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>
<td>
<td>
<table cellpadding=0 width=600 border=0 cellspacing=0>
<table cellpadding=0 width=500 border=0 cellspacing=0>
<tr>
<tr>
<td width=49%>&nbsp;</td>
<td width=49%>&nbsp;</td>
<td width=2% textalign=center>\/</td>
<td width=2% textalign=center></td>
<td width=49%>Median point</td>
<td width=49%>Median point</td>
</tr>
</tr>
Line 138: Line 134:
<td align=right>Nashville</td>
<td align=right>Nashville</td>
<td>
<td>
<table cellpadding=0 width=600 border=0 cellspacing=0>
<table cellpadding=0 width=500 border=0 cellspacing=0>
<tr>
<tr>
<td bgcolor=gray width=8%>&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=gray width=8%>&nbsp;</td>
Line 153: Line 149:
<td align=right>Chattanooga</td>
<td align=right>Chattanooga</td>
<td>
<td>
<table cellpadding=0 width=600 border=0 cellspacing=0>
<table cellpadding=0 width=500 border=0 cellspacing=0>
<tr>
<tr>
<td bgcolor=gray width=8%></td>
<td bgcolor=gray width=8%></td>
Line 173: Line 169:
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;</td>
<td>
<td>
<table cellpadding=1 width=600 border=0 cellspacing=1>
<table cellpadding=1 border=0 cellspacing=1>
<tr>
<tr>
<td width=20%>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=gray>&nbsp;</td>
<td bgcolor=gray>&nbsp;</td>
<td>&nbsp;Removed&nbsp;ratings&nbsp;(sorted&nbsp;to&nbsp;both&nbsp;ends&nbsp;evenly&nbsp;for&nbsp;easy&nbsp;comparison&nbsp;of&nbsp;medians&nbsp;with&nbsp;above).</td>
<td>&nbsp;Removed&nbsp;ratings&nbsp;(sorted&nbsp;to&nbsp;both&nbsp;ends&nbsp;evenly&nbsp;for&nbsp;easy&nbsp;comparison&nbsp;of&nbsp;medians&nbsp;with&nbsp;above).</td>
<td width=20%>&nbsp;</td>
</tr>
</tr>
</table>
</table>
</td>
</td>
</table>
</table>

Chattanooga now has the same number of "Fair" ratings as "Good" and "Excellent" combined, so its median is rounded down to "Fair", while Nashville's median remains at "Good"<ref group="nb">After removal, Chattanooga has 42% of the initial electorate at "Fair", 27% "Good", and 15% "Excellent", while Nashville has 32% "Fair", 26% "Good", and 26% "Excellent"</ref> and so '''Nashville''', the capital in real life, wins.

If voters from Knoxville and Chattanooga were to rate Nashville as "Poor" and/or both sets of voters were to rate Chattanooga as "Excellent", in an attempt to make their preferred candidate Chattanooga win, the winner would still be Nashville.

==Variants==

Variants of majority judgment have been described. Fabre considers three: the typical judgment, usual judgment, and central judgment.<ref name="Fabre20">{{Cite journal |first=Adrien |last=Fabre |title=Tie-breaking the Highest Median: Alternatives to the Majority Judgment |journal=[[Social Choice and Welfare]] |year=2020 |volume=56 |pages=101–124 |url=https://github.com/bixiou/highest_median/raw/master/Tie-breaking%20Highest%20Median%20-%20Fabre%202019.pdf |doi=10.1007/s00355-020-01269-9|issn=0176-1714}}</ref>. He argues that all of these are less sensitive to noise than the majority judgment, with the usual judgment being the most robust, though the calculation that determines the winner is more complex.


==See also==
==See also==

* [[List of democracy and elections-related topics]]
* [[Voting system]]
* [[Voting system]]
* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZoGH7d51bvc&t=917s Reforming the presidential election! (in French)]
== Notes ==
== Notes ==
{{reflist|group=nb}}
{{Reflist}}


== References ==
== References ==
{{Reflist}}
*Balinski, Michel, and Laraki, Rida (2010). ''Majority Judgment: Measuring, Ranking, and Electing'', MIT Press


{{DEFAULTSORT:Bucklin Voting}}
[[Category:Non-proportional multi-winner electoral systems]]
[[Category:Single winner electoral systems]]
[[Category:Preferential electoral systems]]
[[Category:Monotonic electoral systems]]
[[Category:Monotonic electoral systems]]
[[Category:Graded Bucklin methods]]
[[Category:Single-winner voting methods]]
[[Category:Cardinal voting methods]]
[[Category:No-favorite-betrayal electoral systems]]

Latest revision as of 17:28, 21 April 2024

Wikipedia has an article on:

Majority Judgment is a single-winner voting system proposed by Michel Balinski and Rida Laraki.[1][2] Voters freely score each candidate in one of several named qualities, for instance from "excellent" to "bad". Each quality is associated with a numeric score and the candidate with the highest median score is the winner. If more than one candidate has the same median grade, a tiebreaker is used which sees how "broad" that median grade is. Majority Judgment can be considered as a form of Bucklin voting which allows equal ranks.

Voting process

Voters are allowed rated ballots, on which they may assign a grade or judgement to each candidate. Badinski and Laraki suggest six grading levels, from "Excellent" to "To Reject". Multiple candidates may be given the same grade if the voter desires.

The median grade for each candidate is found, for instance by sorting their list of grades and finding the middle one. If the middle falls between two different grades, the lower of the two is used.

The candidate with the highest median grade wins. If several candidates share the higest median grade, all other candidates are eliminated. Then, one copy of that grade is removed from each remaining candidate's list of grades, and the new median is found, until an unambiguous winner is found.

Satisfied and failed criteria

Majority Judgment voting satisfies the majority criterion for rated ballots, and also a weak form of the mutual majority criterion (a majority giving only and all of their preferred candidates perfect grades will win), the monotonicity criterion, and later-no-help. Assuming that ratings are given independently of other candidates, it satisfies the independence of clones criterion and the independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion[3] - although this latter criterion is incompatible with the majority criterion if voters shift their judgments in order to express their preferences between the available candidates.

It fails the Condorcet criterion,[nb 1] later-no-harm,[nb 2] consistency, the Condorcet loser criterion,[nb 3] and the participation criterion.[nb 4] It also fails the ranked or preferential majority criterion, which is incompatible with the passed criterion independence of irrelevant alternatives, and reversal symmetry.

Example application

Tennessee's four cities are spread throughout the state
Tennessee's four cities are spread throughout the state

Imagine that Tennessee is having an election on the location of its capital. The population of Tennessee is concentrated around its four major cities, which are spread throughout the state. For this example, suppose that the entire electorate lives in these four cities, and that everyone wants to live as near the capital as possible.

The candidates for the capital are:

  • Memphis, the state's largest city, with 42% of the voters, but located far from the other cities
  • Nashville, with 26% of the voters, near the center of Tennessee
  • Knoxville, with 17% of the voters
  • Chattanooga, with 15% of the voters

The preferences of the voters would be divided like this:

42% of voters
(close to Memphis)
26% of voters
(close to Nashville)
15% of voters
(close to Chattanooga)
17% of voters
(close to Knoxville)
  1. Memphis
  2. Nashville
  3. Chattanooga
  4. Knoxville
  1. Nashville
  2. Chattanooga
  3. Knoxville
  4. Memphis
  1. Chattanooga
  2. Knoxville
  3. Nashville
  4. Memphis
  1. Knoxville
  2. Chattanooga
  3. Nashville
  4. Memphis

If there were four ratings named "Excellent", "Good", "Fair", and "Poor", and each voter assigned four different ratings to the four cities, then the sorted scores would be as follows:

City   
  Median point
Nashville
 
Chattanooga
 
Knoxville
 
Memphis
 
   
 
          Excellent      Good      Fair      Poor  

The median rating for Nashville and Chattanooga is "Good"; for Knoxville, "Fair"; and for Memphis, "Poor". Nashville and Chattanooga are tied, so "Good" ratings have to be removed from both, until their medians become different. After removing 16% "Good" ratings from the votes of each, the sorted ratings are now:

City   
  Median point
Nashville
   
Chattanooga
 
   
 
          Removed ratings (sorted to both ends evenly for easy comparison of medians with above).

Chattanooga now has the same number of "Fair" ratings as "Good" and "Excellent" combined, so its median is rounded down to "Fair", while Nashville's median remains at "Good"[nb 5] and so Nashville, the capital in real life, wins.

If voters from Knoxville and Chattanooga were to rate Nashville as "Poor" and/or both sets of voters were to rate Chattanooga as "Excellent", in an attempt to make their preferred candidate Chattanooga win, the winner would still be Nashville.

Variants

Variants of majority judgment have been described. Fabre considers three: the typical judgment, usual judgment, and central judgment.[4]. He argues that all of these are less sensitive to noise than the majority judgment, with the usual judgment being the most robust, though the calculation that determines the winner is more complex.

See also

Notes

  1. Strategically in the strong Nash equilibrium, MJ passes the Condorcet criterion.
  2. MJ provides a weaker guarantee similar to LNH: rating another candidate at or below your preferred winner's median rating (as opposed to your own rating for the winner) cannot harm the winner.
  3. Nevertheless, it passes a slightly weakened version, the majority condorcet loser criterion, in which all defeats are by an absolute majority (for instance, if there aren't equal rankings).
  4. It can only fail the participation criterion when, among other conditions, the new ballot rates both of the candidates in question on the same side of the winning median, and the prior distribution of ratings is more sharply-peaked or irregular for one of the candidates.
  5. After removal, Chattanooga has 42% of the initial electorate at "Fair", 27% "Good", and 15% "Excellent", while Nashville has 32% "Fair", 26% "Good", and 26% "Excellent"

References

  1. M. Balinski & R. Laraki (2010). Majority Judgment. MIT Press. ISBN 978-0-262-01513-4.
  2. de Swart, Harrie (2021-11-16). "How to Choose a President, Mayor, Chair: Balinski and Laraki Unpacked". The Mathematical Intelligencer. doi:10.1007/s00283-021-10124-3. ISSN 0343-6993.
  3. Badinski and Laraki, Majority Judgment, p. 217
  4. Fabre, Adrien (2020). "Tie-breaking the Highest Median: Alternatives to the Majority Judgment" (PDF). Social Choice and Welfare. 56: 101–124. doi:10.1007/s00355-020-01269-9. ISSN 0176-1714.