Method evaluation poll 2024: Difference between revisions
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<br>[[Schulze]] |
<br>[[Schulze]] |
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<br>[[STAR]]</li> |
<br>[[STAR]]</li> |
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<li value=7>Smith//Score</li> |
<li value=7>[[Smith//Score]]</li> |
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<li>Margins-Sorted Approval |
<li>[[Approval Sorted Margins|Margins-Sorted Approval]] |
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<br>Schwartz Woodall |
<br>[[Schwartz Woodall]] |
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<br>Smith//Approval (implicit) |
<br>[[Smith//Approval]] (implicit) |
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<br>Woodall</li> |
<br>[[Woodall's_method|Woodall]]</li> |
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<li value=12>Smith//Approval (explicit)</li> |
<li value=12>[[Smith//Approval]] (explicit)</li> |
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<li>[[Raynaud]]</li> |
<li>[[Raynaud]]</li> |
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<li>[[Baldwin]]</li> |
<li>[[Baldwin]]</li> |
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<br>Smith//DAC</li> |
<br>Smith//DAC</li> |
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<li value=18>Copeland//Borda ([[Ranked Robin]])</li> |
<li value=18>Copeland//Borda ([[Ranked Robin]])</li> |
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<li>Condorcet//Borda (Black)</li> |
<li>Condorcet//Borda ([[Black's method|Black]])</li> |
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<li>Approval with manual runoff |
<li>Approval with manual runoff |
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<br>Double Defeat, Hare |
<br>Double Defeat, Hare |
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<br>RCIPE</li> |
<br>[[RCIPE]]</li> |
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<li value=23>[[Majority Judgement]]</li> |
<li value=23>[[Majority Judgement]]</li> |
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<li>[[Instant-runoff voting]]</li> |
<li>[[Instant-runoff voting]]</li> |
Latest revision as of 14:45, 20 May 2024
This was a "method evaluation poll" that was conducted in 2024 on the election-methods mailing list.
The poll instructions
The readers were asked to evaluate a number of voting methods on merit in use. Michael Ossipoff put it as:
This poll is intended to be about merit-in-use. ...disregarding winnability & proposability. ...but taking into account strategy-problems,, expense of implementation, expense & difficulty of administration, complexity & consequent insecurity of count, & consequent count-fraud vulnerability. So, it's about merit-in-use, in all its aspects.
while Kristofer Munsterhjelm phrased it as follows:
"What methods do you consider to have the greatest merit in use for public elections?
For the ranked ballot, rank the methods in order of merit. Every aspect relevant to the methods' suitability for public use is relevant: including vulnerability to strategy, expense of implementation and administration, count complexity, and vulnerability to fraud.
However, the answer should not take into account whether the method is currently being proposed by an advocacy group, nor how much momentum a particular group or reform movement, if it exists, enjoys at the moment."
Results
There were 11 voters, who provided ranked ballots and approval cutoffs.
The results were, according to the Schulze method:
- Ranked Pairs (wv)
- Benham
- Approval
Minmax (wv)
Schulze
STAR - Smith//Score
- Margins-Sorted Approval
Schwartz Woodall
Smith//Approval (implicit)
Woodall - Smith//Approval (explicit)
- Raynaud
- Baldwin
- Max Strength Transitive Beatpath
- Margins-Sorted Minimum Losing Votes
Smith//DAC - Copeland//Borda (Ranked Robin)
- Condorcet//Borda (Black)
- Approval with manual runoff
Double Defeat, Hare
RCIPE - Majority Judgement
- Instant-runoff voting
- Plurality
- Write-in: BTR-IRV
- Write-in: Score
- Write-in: Borda
Write-in: Condorcet//Plurality
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