Cardinal proportional representation: Difference between revisions
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(Clarifying intro, and proposing a move to Cardinal proportional representation) |
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'''Cardinal proportional representation''' (or "'''Cardinal PR'''") is a class containing [[cardinal voting systems]] used for [[proportional representation]] in multi-seat elections.
It should be noted that these methods follow different types and philosophies of proportionality than most other proportional representation methods. They all fail the "[[Proportionality for Solid Coalitions]]" criterion, though [[Sequential Monroe voting]] comes closest.▼
Because of the nature of [[Ratings ballot|rated ballots]], it is possible to make assumptions that allow us to examine many different variations of what it means to "represent" voters in the multi-winner context, and to observe to what degree they are all represented.
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It is possible to use a cardinal PR method to fill all but one of the seats in an election, and then use either [[STAR voting]] or a [[:Category:Condorcet-cardinal hybrid methods|Condorcet-cardinal hybrid method]] to fill the final seat. For example, SPAV could be used to fill the first four of five seats, and then with the ballots in their reweighted forms, the [[Smith//Approval]] winner could be elected to the final seat. This can be done with ranked or rated ballots using [[Approval threshold|approval thresholds]] to find out both approvals and [[Head-to-head matchup|head-to-head matchups]]. One advantage this holds over using [[Single transferable vote#Deciding the election of the final seat|STV#Deciding the election of the final seat]] or any ranked PR method with a Condorcet method for the final seat is that there appear to be no simple, hand-countable ranked PR methods that reduce to [[D'Hondt]] in their [[party list case]], whereas SPAV and other cardinal PR methods do.
▲It should be noted that these methods follow different types and philosophies of proportionality than most other proportional representation methods. They all fail the "[[Proportionality for Solid Coalitions]]" criterion, though [[Sequential Monroe voting]] comes closest.
== See also ==
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