Talk:Distributed Score Voting: Difference between revisions

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Revision as of 00:46, 9 February 2020 (view source) BetterVotingAdvocacy (talk \| contribs) No edit summary ← Older edit		Revision as of 12:49, 9 February 2020 (view source) Aldo Tragni (talk \| contribs) No edit summary Newer edit →
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	: Every voting method that passes the majority criterion fails IIA, see the Wikipedia article. What you're talking about sounds like [[ISDA]], which by the way is mutually incompatible with IIA, since ISDA implies the majority criterion. . [[User:BetterVotingAdvocacy\|BetterVotingAdvocacy]] ([[User talk:BetterVotingAdvocacy\|talk]]) 00:45, 9 February 2020 (UTC)		: Every voting method that passes the majority criterion fails IIA, see the Wikipedia article. What you're talking about sounds like [[ISDA]], which by the way is mutually incompatible with IIA, since ISDA implies the majority criterion. . [[User:BetterVotingAdvocacy\|BetterVotingAdvocacy]] ([[User talk:BetterVotingAdvocacy\|talk]]) 00:45, 9 February 2020 (UTC)

			:: You're right, in the Smith set I have to apply extra rules to reduce it in order to satisfy the IIA; specifically I have to reduce the possible condorcet paradox to a group of only 3 best candidates in a cyclical path; I'm looking for a definition for this but for now the maximum I have found is Smith set.