FpA-fpC

fpA-fpC (for first preference A minus first preference C) is a three-candidate Condorcet method based on first preference Copeland. Its election cases are:

• If there's a Condorcet winner, then that candidate wins.
• If the Smith set is size two, then the winner is according to majority rule.
• If the Smith set is size three, then for each candidate, assume without loss of generality that the candidate is A in an A>B>C>A cycle. A's score is A's first preferences minus C's first preferences. The candidate with the highest score wins.

A more concise variant that breaks size-two Smith sets differently is:

• Let A be the candidate whose score is to be evaluated. Then A's score is the sum, over all candidates B who A pairwise beats, two times A's first preferences plus B's first preferences.
• The candidate with the highest score wins.

This method shares the strategy resistance of Smith-IRV hybrids, such as dominant mutual third burial resistance; yet, unlike them, is monotone. It is open (not obvious) how to extend the method to more than three candidates in a way that retains both monotonicity and strategy resistance.

It produces similar results to Condorcet,IFPP.

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