Young's method: Difference between revisions
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Determining the Young winner is NP-hard, and the method is not summable. |
Determining the Young winner is NP-hard, and the method is not summable. |
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== Peyton Young == |
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{{wikipedia|Peyton Young}} |
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'''Hobart Peyton Young''' (born March 9, 1945) is an American game theorist and economist known for his contributions to [[evolutionary game theory]] and its application to the study of institutional and technological change, as well as the theory of learning in games. He is currently centennial professor at the [[London School of Economics]], James Meade Professor of Economics Emeritus at the [[University of Oxford]], professorial fellow at [[Nuffield College]] Oxford, and research principal at the Office of Financial Research at the [[U.S. Department of the Treasury]]. |
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Peyton Young was named a fellow of the [[Econometric Society]] in 1995, a fellow of the [[British Academy]] in 2007, and a fellow of the [[American Academy of Arts and Sciences]] in 2018. He served as president of the Game Theory Society from 2006–08.[http://www.gametheorysociety.org/membership/officers.html] He has published widely on learning in games, the evolution of social norms and institutions, cooperative game theory, bargaining and negotiation, taxation and cost allocation, political representation, voting procedures, and distributive justice. |
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== References == |
== References == |
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Revision as of 08:13, 23 August 2020
Young's method is a Condorcet method that elects the candidate that can be made into a Condorcet winner by ignoring as few ballots as possible. It was devised by H. P. Young in 1977.[1]
Determining the Young winner is NP-hard, and the method is not summable.
Peyton Young
(copied from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Peyton_Young&oldid=965515042 )
Hobart Peyton Young (born March 9, 1945) is an American game theorist and economist known for his contributions to evolutionary game theory and its application to the study of institutional and technological change, as well as the theory of learning in games. He is currently centennial professor at the London School of Economics, James Meade Professor of Economics Emeritus at the University of Oxford, professorial fellow at Nuffield College Oxford, and research principal at the Office of Financial Research at the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
Peyton Young was named a fellow of the Econometric Society in 1995, a fellow of the British Academy in 2007, and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2018. He served as president of the Game Theory Society from 2006–08.[1] He has published widely on learning in games, the evolution of social norms and institutions, cooperative game theory, bargaining and negotiation, taxation and cost allocation, political representation, voting procedures, and distributive justice.
References
- ↑ Young, H. P. (1977-12-01). "Extending Condorcet's rule". Journal of Economic Theory. 16 (2): 335–353. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90012-6. ISSN 0022-0531.