FpA-fpC: Difference between revisions
(Inserting text from the talk page into the #References section of this page, copying text that User:Kristomun provided) |
(User:Kristomun asserts that this method produces similar results to many methods that meet the Condorcet winner criterion, as well as "IFPP", which is indecipherable jargon that we should avoid using on electowiki. "IFPP" is an abbreviation for "Improved First Past the Post". It's unclear what is improved, but User:KVenzke and User:Homunq from the old Electowiki might be able to explain.) |
||
| Line 7: | Line 7: | ||
This method shares the strategy resistance of Smith-IRV hybrids, such as [[chicken dilemma]] compliance and [[dominant mutual third burial resistance]]; yet, unlike them, is monotone. It is open (not obvious) how to extend the method to more than three candidates in a way that retains both monotonicity and strategy resistance.<ref group="fn" name="Footnote">Any generalization will preserve its [[chicken dilemma]] compliance, as that criterion is only defined on three-candidate elections. However, this is not true of [[dominant mutual third burial resistance]].</ref> |
This method shares the strategy resistance of Smith-IRV hybrids, such as [[chicken dilemma]] compliance and [[dominant mutual third burial resistance]]; yet, unlike them, is monotone. It is open (not obvious) how to extend the method to more than three candidates in a way that retains both monotonicity and strategy resistance.<ref group="fn" name="Footnote">Any generalization will preserve its [[chicken dilemma]] compliance, as that criterion is only defined on three-candidate elections. However, this is not true of [[dominant mutual third burial resistance]].</ref> |
||
[[User:Kristomun]] asserts that this method produces similar results to many methods that meet the [[Condorcet winner criterion]], as well as "IFPP", which is indecipherable jargon that we should avoid using on [[electowiki]]. "IFPP" is an abbreviation for "[[Improved First Past the Post]]". It's unclear what is improved, but User:KVenzke and User:Homunq from the old [[Electowiki]] might be able to explain. |
|||
It produces similar results to [[Condorcet]],[[IFPP]]. |
|||
{{stub}} |
{{stub}} |
||
Revision as of 12:55, 3 March 2022
fpA-fpC (for first preference A minus first preference C) is a three-candidate Condorcet method based on first preference Copeland.[1] Its election cases are:
- If there's a Condorcet winner, then that candidate wins.
- If the Smith set is size two, then the winner is according to majority rule.
- If the Smith set is size three, then for each candidate, assume without loss of generality that the candidate is A in an A>B>C>A cycle. A's score is A's first preferences minus C's first preferences. The candidate with the highest score wins.
This method shares the strategy resistance of Smith-IRV hybrids, such as chicken dilemma compliance and dominant mutual third burial resistance; yet, unlike them, is monotone. It is open (not obvious) how to extend the method to more than three candidates in a way that retains both monotonicity and strategy resistance.[fn 1]
User:Kristomun asserts that this method produces similar results to many methods that meet the Condorcet winner criterion, as well as "IFPP", which is indecipherable jargon that we should avoid using on electowiki. "IFPP" is an abbreviation for "Improved First Past the Post". It's unclear what is improved, but User:KVenzke and User:Homunq from the old Electowiki might be able to explain.
This page is a stub - please add to it.
Notes
- ↑ Any generalization will preserve its chicken dilemma compliance, as that criterion is only defined on three-candidate elections. However, this is not true of dominant mutual third burial resistance.
References
Automatically generated
The references described below are automatically pulled from the article prose above:
- ↑ Munsterhjelm, K. (2016-02-07). "Strategy-resistant monotone methods". Election-methods mailing list archives.
Manually inserted
This is a list of emails to the EM-list, originally compiled by User:Kristomun in a comment on the "Talk:" page for this article, but possibly augmented by others after February 2022:
- "Strategy-resistant monotone methods" 2016-02-07 (User:Kristomun)
- "Re: MJ -- The easiest method to 'tolerate'" 2016-09-22 (User:Kristomun)
- "Resolvable weighted positional systems all fail independence of clones" 2017-12-03 (User:Kristomun)
- "Fwd: What are some simple methods that accomplish the following conditions?" 2019-06-01 (Forest Simmons)
- "Re: Improved Copeland" 2019-06-07 (User:Kristomun, also Forest Simmons)
- "Unmanipulable majority and Condorcet" 2020-01-03 (User:Kristomun, also Forest Simmons)
- "Minimally manipulable methods: preliminary results" 2020-11-02 (User:Kristomun; first post about the MIP minimally manipulable method search)
- "Re: A Metric for Issue/Candidate Space" 2020-12-23 (Kevin Venzke)
- "Re: Best Ranked Preference Deterministic Method?" 2020-12-24 (User:Kristomun, KV, FS)
- "Re: extending fpA-fpC" 2020-12-26 (Kevin Venzke)
- "Re: Agenda Based Banks" 2021-08-04 (Forest Simmons)
- "Re: Defeat Strength Demystified" 2021-09-17 (Forest Simmons)
- "Re: 'Independence of cycles' and a possible new method" 2021-12-12 (User:Kristomun, Toby Pereira, Colin Champion, Forest Simmons)
- "Re: Quick and Clean Burial Resistant Smith, compromise" 2022-01-09 (User:Kristomun, Kevin Venzke, Daniel Carrera, Forest Simmons)